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Abstract 
It is shown that spillovers can enhance private returns to innovation if they feed back into the dynamic research 
of the original inventor (Internalized spillovers), but will always reduce private returns, if the 
original inventor does not benefit from the advancements other inventors build into the 
“spilled” knowledge (Externalized spillovers). I empirically identify unique patterns of 
knowledge flows (based on patent citations), which provide information about whether 
“spilled” knowledge is reabsorbed by its inventor. A simple model of sequential innovation 
with dynamic spillovers is developed, which predicts that market value and R&D 
expenditures should rise with Internalized spillovers and fall with Externalized spillovers. 
These predications are confirmed using panel data on U.S. firms between 1981 and 2001. To 
the extent that firms internalize some of the spillovers they create, the classical 
underinvestment problem in R&D will be mitigated and the central role of spillovers in 
promoting economic growth will be enhanced. 
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1. Introduction
Knowledge spillovers are at the centre of the modern endogenous growth literature. Nu-
merous studies have analyzed, empirically and theoretically, the contribution of knowl-
edge spillovers for economic performance1. The present paper studies knowledge spillovers
(hereafter, spillovers) in the context of sequential innovation: ‘spilled’ knowledge inspires
follow-up research outside the boundaries of the inventing firm.
It has been well recognized that spillovers have countervailing implications for the
incentive to innovate: on the one hand, spillovers encourage future research, but on the
other hand, they discourage current research due to obsolescence. There is an essential
distinction between the obsolescence of knowledge and the obsolescence of the rents an
inventor captures on its knowledge. When knowledge is sequentially developed it cannot
become obsolete since it inspires subsequent developments and it is embodied in a more
advanced knowledge. However, the stream of rents the original inventor captures on its
old knowledge could depreciate, especially if all the subsequent developments are done by
other agents.
Schumpeter (1943) introduced the concept of creative destruction; the arrival of new
knowledge renders old knowledge obsolete2. For example, the arrival of knowledge of how
to produce power using the steam engine renders the knowledge of producing power using
water obsolete. Yet, innovations that render knowledge obsolete cannot be sequential. For
example, the knowledge of converting heat to work has been embodied in the first New-
come automobile engine and later in the vapor pressure engine, before being substantially
improved by Englishman who studied the conversion rates from heat and back, which
inspired a whole field of “thermodynamics” research3. The original knowledge embodied
1The theory of endogenous growth was pioneered by Romer (1986) and Grossman and Helpman (1991).
The empirical literature has studied various types of spillovers. Griliches (1992) provides a comprehensive
survey of the micro empirical literature.
2Creative destruction both limits and generates the incentive to innovate by rent seeking firms. This
idea is modeled in various ways in the endogenous growth literature. The obsolescence of private returns
to R&D has been empirically addressed, using patent renewals, by Schankerman and Pakes (1986), Pakes
(1986) and Lanjouw (1998).
3Based on Mokyer( 2005).
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in the Newcome engine did not become obsolete; on the contrary, it was the basis of many
subsequent improvements. Yet, its commercial value to Newcome should have become ob-
solete once the original knowledge spread to other agents and was sequentially advanced
by them.
However, should we still argue that private returns to the old knowledge become ob-
solete, if the inventing firm reabsorbs in a future period its old knowledge including all
the advancements the other agents have built into it? I empirically show that the answer
should be no. Spillovers that feed back into the inventing firm should mitigate the nega-
tive eﬀect spillovers have on private returns, since in this case, the inventing firm can still
extract rents from its old knowledge even though other agents have further advanced it.
In their classic paper, Aghion and Howitt (1992) model the idea that spillovers raise
private obsolescence as a negative dependency of current research on future research. Ac-
cordingly, the inventing firm has a lower incentive to innovate in case its knowledge is
spilled to other agents that further advance it. Actually, spillovers can generate a “no-
growth trap”; the negative eﬀect of spillovers on private obsolescence can be so large that
the incentive to create the first generation of knowledge completely disappears.
Nonetheless, in a dynamic context, this negative eﬀect of spillovers could be substan-
tially mitigated. The inventing firm could reabsorb its spilled knowledge in a future period,
which should reduce the obsolescence of rents the inventing firm captures. Suppose there
are two economies that are identical in all dimensions, but in the first economy firms are
more likely to reabsorb their spilled knowledge. We would expect innovation and growth
to be higher in the first economy, since spillovers would discourage current research to a
lesser extent.
The major contribution of this paper is to develop an empirical methodology, based on
patents and citations, that allows measuring spillovers and the extent they feed back into
the inventing firm. I define this feeding back of spillovers as technological internalization
and show it is an important channel through which private rents are appropriated. Tech-
nological internalization is identified by distinguishing between two types of spillovers:
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Internalized and Externalized. Internalized spillovers are spillovers that feed back into the
dynamic research of the inventing firm, whereas Externalized spillovers do not. Techno-
logical internalization is argued to be higher when spillovers are more Internalized and less
Externalized.
In addition to the technological channel of internalization, firms can internalize rents
through a contractual channel. The literature has studied the theoretical aspects of con-
tractual internalization, mainly as a mechanism through which rents are shared between
early innovators and their followers. Green and Scotchmer (1995), Scotchmer (1996) and
Chang (1995) study the theoretical aspects of the eﬀect of a second-generation invention
on the rents captured on the first-generation invention4.
However, the literature has not yet investigated the technological channel through
which an inventor can reap the rents on its discovery. Potentially, this channel of inter-
nalization could be highly important for the generation of “pure” spillovers. According to
the endogenous growth literature, “pure” spillovers, which occur when knowledge trans-
fers freely across inventors, allow the economy to depart from decreasing returns in the
production of knowledge and achieve sustained economic growth. Contractual internaliza-
tion hinders the free access to knowledge (since the receivers of knowledge have to incur
some usage costs). Hence, contractual internalization should diminish economic growth,
through restricting the increasing returns in knowledge production. Yet, under technolog-
ical internalization, “pure” spillovers should not diminish in any obvious way, since private
rents can be captured without limiting future research. Thus, technological internalization
should be a more desirable channel through which private rents are captured.
A famous example that illustrates the importance of technological internalization for
private returns is the invention of the CT (Computed Tomography) scanners. Trajtenberg
(1990) finds that this invention is associated with large social returns. However, private
returns to this discovery were low, as the spillovers this invention created were mostly
Externalized. This technology was developed by EMI (a British electronic company) and
4Bessen and Maskin (2002) argue that competition in research could actually encourage the incentive
to innovate when innovation is cumulative and sequential.
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was patented in 1973. A market for CT scanners emerged following rapid innovation
aiming at exploiting the new technological opportunities. From 1975 onwards, hundreds
of oﬀspring inventions were created. In the early years, most of these inventions were
developed by EMI itself, however, after less than a decade EMI failed to capture any
significant portion of the market (which was mainly dominated by General Electric) and
was no longer at the frontier of the technology it had originated. This implies that the
private returns to the invention of the CT scanners were strongly negatively aﬀected by
the spillovers this invention created.
The essence of my empirical methodology is as follows: knowledge is identified as a
patent and knowledge flow is identified as a patent citation5. For each patent in the
sample a “family-tree” is constructed, based on the citations the patent receives. Figure
1 illustrates this methodology for a simple case of a sequence of three patents. Assume
patent m cites patent l and patent n cites patent m. Hence, the “family-tree” of patent l
includes both patent m and patent n, where, patent m is the ‘child’ of patent l and patent
n is the ‘grandchild’ of patent l. Given this “family-tree”, invention n is classified as an
oﬀspring of invention l, even though knowledge did not transfer directly from invention l to
invention l. Applying this method to a high-order sequence of citations allows tracing the
trajectory knowledge has followed, while spreading across inventions and firms. Based on
these trajectories, it can be determined whether knowledge that leaves the inventing firm
and is further advanced by other firms will have been reabsorbed by the inventing firm in a
future period (e.g., if patents l and n are held by the same firm whereas patentm is owned
by another firm, the spillovers created by invention l are technologically internalized by
the inventing firm).
5Prior studies that empirically identified citations as knowledge flows are Jaﬀe, Henderson and Tra-
jtenberg (1993), Caballero and Jaﬀe (1993) and Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (1999).
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Figure 1: The “family-tree” of invention l
A model of sequential innovation with dynamic spillovers is developed: private returns
to the knowledge k are defined as the stream of profits the inventing firm captures from all
the subsequent developments it introduces along the line of research k originates. Spillovers
are modeled as the follow-up developments of k that are invented by other agents along
the line of research. In a dynamic perspective, private rents and, therefore, the R&D
expenditures of the inventing firm would depend on the extent the inventing firm is able
to build on the external developments of k.
Thus, the model predicts that technological internalization would raise the private
returns and R&D expenditures of the inventing firm. These predictions are confirmed
using panel data on the largest 500 patenting firms in the US between 1980 and 2001.
There is a substantial firm-level variation in technological internalization, even within
narrowly defined industries. This firm—level variation is exploited in estimating the eﬀect
of technological internalization on the market valuation of the R&D stock of the firm. The
estimation results show that the eﬀect of the R&D stock on market value intensifies when
technological internalization is higher. A one standard deviation increase in the measure
of Internalized spillovers raises, at the mean, the market valuation of an additional dollar
spent on R&D by 30 percent, whereas a one standard deviation increase in the measure of
Externalized spillovers lowers, at the mean, the market valuation of an additional dollar
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spent on R&D by 10 percent.
In addition to quantifying the eﬀect of technological internalization on private returns,
the findings from the market value estimation also suggest that firms themselves are aware
of their technological internalization and take it into consideration when making the R&D
decisions. This hypothesis is confirmed by estimating a R&D equation; firms that create
more Internalized and less Externalized spillovers, on average, invest substantially more
in R&D.
Finding that the R&D decision of the inventing firm is aﬀected by the type of spillovers
it creates, once more, has important implications for the endogenous growth literature.
Spillovers encourage the innovation activity of the receivers of knowledge, however, the
eﬀect of spillovers on the incentive to create the spilled knowledge at the first place depends
on whether they are Internalized or Externalized.
In summary, I show that firms are able to internalize dynamically some of their knowl-
edge that spills to other firms. To the extent that such internalization occurs, the classical
underinvestment problem in R&D will be mitigated, as the negative eﬀect of spillovers on
private returns weakens.
The rest of the paper is organized as following: section 2 presents the analytical frame-
work, section 3 describes the empirical methodology, section 4 discusses the data, the
econometric specifications and findings are reported in section 5 and section 6 concludes.
2. Analytical motivation
Spillovers enhance the technological opportunities created by knowledge by increasing
the probability that subsequent developments of the knowledge will occur. The extent
spillovers raise private returns depends on whether the inventing firm benefits from these
enhanced technological opportunities. Technological internalization should be higher when
spillovers are more likely to feed back into the inventing firm.
Technological internalization is represented by the parameter θ. It is assumed that
firms do not behave in any strategic way to aﬀect θ or the flow of their knowledge to other
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firms (although these might be interesting extensions). Also, the inventing firm cannot
extract monetary payoﬀs from the spread of its knowledge to follow-up developers (i.e.,
contractual internalization is not allowed). The model does not include time. Periods are
defined by the arrival of stages of developments (i.e., every period includes one stage of
development) and there is no discounting.
The model distinguishes between static and dynamic returns to innovation6. Static
returns are defined as the one period stream of profits attributed to a single invention7.
Dynamic returns, however, also consider the stream of profits the inventing firm can
capture by continuing to invent along the line of research it originates. The ability to do
so depends on the extent the inventing firm can build on the follow-up developments that
other firms introduce along the line of research.
Suppose firm i (the inventing firm) holds a piece of knowledge k, which has the potential
of being sequentially developed an infinite number of times. The static returns to this
knowledge include the stream of profits firm i receives from this invention, until these
profits become obsolete, which occurs with the development of the next generation of the
knowledge k. Nevertheless, dynamic returns to the knowledge k do not become obsolete
once a subsequent development takes place, if firm i continues to invent along the line of
research k originates.
Let v be a constant one-shot pay-oﬀ associated with winning a development stage of
the knowledge k. In every development stage there are n firms competing in a patent
race. Only one firm is allowed to win a development stage. If more than one firm makes
a discovery, a patent cannot be granted, and both firms engage in Bertrand competition
that drives profits to zero.
Every generation of development requires a constant R&D investment of x, which
yields a positive probability p of making a discovery by firm i (i.e., with probability p firm
6Bessen and Maskin (2002) also provide a model of sequential innovation that studies the incentive to
innovate in a similar dynamic framework.
7The huge literature on the optimal design of patents rights studies the eﬀect of the outward flow of
knowledge on static private returns (which patents aim to protect). See, for example, Klemperer (1990),
Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Scotchmer (1999) and Cornelli and Schankerman (1999).
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i discovers a piece of knowledge that awards the static payoﬀ v, if no other firm invents
the given generation). Denote by q the positive probability that at least one of firm i’s
competitors along the line of research makes a discovery in every stage of development.
Hence, the expected static rent firm i captures from participating in a development
stage, Z, which is assumed to be strictly positive, is:
Z = p(1− q)v − x (2.1)
2.1. Dynamic returns and reabsorbing spilled knowledge
As a departure point, assume that once firm i fails to win in a given generation, it cannot
continue developing the next generation, even if some other firm has been successful in in-
venting this generation. In this case, technological internalization cannot occur. Dynamic
returns to the knowledge k are:
Wi = (p(1− q)v − x) + p(1− q) (p(1− q)v − x) + p2(1− q)2 (p(1− q)v − x) + ... (2.2)
The first term on the right hand side of equation (2.2) is the expected static pay-oﬀ of
winning the first generation of development, the second term is the expected static pay-
oﬀ of winning the second generation of development, which is positive with probability
p(1 − q) (the probability of winning the first generation), the third term is the expected
static pay-oﬀ of winning the third generation (which is positive only if firm i had won the
first and second generations of developments that occur with probability p2(1−q)2) and so
forth. It is straightforward to show that since an infinite number of potential developments
is assumed, Wi becomes:
Wi =
vp(1− q)− x
1− p(1− q) (2.3)
Next, suppose that if firm i does not win in a given generation, whereas the subsequent
knowledge has been invented, firm i can still proceed to invent the follow-up generation.
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Thus, the extent technological internalization occurs is captured by the number of ‘second
chances’ the inventing firm gets to stay in the sequential development of its spilled knowl-
edge, if it fails to win in a development stage, but some other firm invents. The number
of “second chances” is denoted by θ (in equation (2.3), θ = 0, since the firm is not allowed
to have any ‘second chances’).
Consider the case where θ = 1, i.e., if firm i fails to win more than once, it is forced out
from the dynamic race (firm i receives one ‘second chance’). In this scenario, the dynamic
returns firm i captures on its knowledge k can be written as:
Wi(θ = 1) = (p(1− q)v − x) + p(1− q) (p(1− q)v − x) + p2(1− q)2 (p(1− q)v − x) + ...
+p(1− q)q(p(1− q)v − x) + 2p(1− q)(1− p)q (p(1− q)v − x) + ... (2.4)
Where the second row on the right hand side of equation (2.4) represents the ‘second
chance’ firm i gets (for example, the first term in the second row is the additional expected
rent the firm captures due to the fact it is allowed not to win in the first generation and
still participate in the development race of the second generation). It is easy to show that
equation (2.4) can be written as:
Wi(θ = 1) =
(1− q) pv − x
(1− p) (1− q)
Ã
1−
µ
q
1− (1− q) p
¶2!
(2.5)
This model can be generalized for any θ in the following way8:
Wi(θ) =
(1− q) pv − x
(1− p) (1− q)
Ã
1−
µ
q
1− (1− q) p
¶θ+1!
(2.6)
This implies that the returns firm i faces increase in θ, since q
1−(1−q)p < 1
9. This sum-
marizes the main theoretical prediction; accordingly, private returns rise with the ability to
reabsorb spilled knowledge (which increases the likelihood of technological internalization).
8See Belenzon (2005) for detail on the derivation of this expression.
9q is also the probability an invention occurs, however, firm i is not the winner. Thus, q = q(1−p)+pq,
which is smaller than 1− p+ pq, as q < 1.
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Note that by substituting θ = 0 into equation (2.6) we get equation (2.3), which is
the dynamic returns firm i captures on its discovery without technological internalization.
Moreover, when the firm has a ‘complete’ ability to build on the research of its rivals
(θ =∞), the dynamic returns become:
Wi(θ =∞) =
v (1− q) p− x
(1− p) (1− q) (2.7)
Hence, dynamic returns are the static returns per subsequent invention (Z in equation
(2.1)), discounted by the probability that the line of research will terminate10 (which occurs
with the probability (1− p) (1− q) , where no firm invents). As the probability that the
line of research terminates falls, dynamic returns rise.
2.2. The incentive to innovate and θ
θ should positively aﬀect the innovation eﬀort of the inventing firm since it increases
private returns (the subscript i is omitted in the rest of this section).
Suppose k originates two diﬀerent lines of research. In the first line of research θ = 0
and in the second line of research θ = ∞. The next section shows how these two types
of lines of research are empirically identified. Lines of research with θ = 0 are associated
with knowledge leaving the boundaries of the inventing firm, never to return (defined as
Externalized lines of research), whereas lines of research with θ =∞ are associated with
the originating knowledge being reabsorbed by the inventing firm (defined as Internalized
lines of research).
The model is slightly modified to allow firm i choosing its R&D expenditures, x, which
aﬀects the probability of inventing, p(x), with p0 (x) > 0, p00 (x) < 0, p(0) = 0 and
p(∞) = 111.
Suppose θ = 0. For simplicity, assume the firm is small in the sense there is no strategic
interaction in R&D. Thus, the dynamic returns to the knowledge k are:
10Compared to equation (2.3) , where Z is divided by the term 1− p(1− q), this term is the probability
that the line of research will be terminated in firm i’s perspective, which occurs when firm i fails to win
in a development stage.
11Decreasing returns to scale in the production of knowledge are necessary to ensure an interior solution
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W (θ = 0) =
vp (x) (1− q)− x
1− p (x) (1− q) (2.8)
The firm maximizes equation (2.8) with respect to its R&D expenditures, x, which
yields the following first order condition:
p0 (x|θ = 0) = 1
(1− q) (W (θ = 0) + v) (2.9)
Let x∗(θ = 0) solve equation (2.9). Thus, the optimality condition equates the marginal
benefit from R&D (the increase in the probability of a discovery that is achieved by a
marginal increase in the R&D spending, p0 (x)), adjusted by the probability that the firm
will be the sole winner in the research race (while taking into account the one shot pay-oﬀ,
v, and the total pay-oﬀ of winning the race,W (θ = 0)), to the marginal cost of R&D, which
is assumed to be 1. An increase in q reduces the probability of winning the development
stage and, consequently, reduces the R&D expenditures of the firm (note that W (θ = 0)
is a decreasing function of q). On the other hand, an increase in the one shot payoﬀ, v,
encourages the firm to innovate more (note that W (θ = 0) is an increasing function of v).
More importantly, a rise in the dynamic rent, given byW (θ = 0) , increases the innovation
eﬀorts of the firm.
Now consider the case where θ = ∞. Dynamic returns to knowledge k are expressed
as:
W (θ =∞) = vp (x) (1− q)− x
(1− p (x)) (1− q) (2.10)
for x. The second order condition is:
∂W 2(·)
∂2x
= p00 (x)− 1
(1− q)
"
−
∂W (·)
∂x
(W (·) + v)2
#
≤ 0
Define x∗ as the optimal R&D decision, thus:
∂W 2(·)
∂2x
|x=x∗ = p00 (x)
For x∗ to be a maximum we require p00 (x) < 0.
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The first order condition for x is:
p0 (x|θ =∞) = 1
(1− q) (W (θ =∞) + v) (2.11)
Let x∗(θ =∞) solve equation (2.11).
Proposition 2.1. The firm innovates more in case θ =∞, compared to the case θ = 0.
To prove proposition 2.1, it is enough to show thatW (θ =∞, x∗(θ =∞)) > W (θ = 0, x∗(θ = 0)),
since p00 (x) < 0. Suppose that W (θ = 0, x∗(θ = 0)) > W (θ =∞, x∗(θ =∞)) . This in-
equality cannot hold, since I have shown above that W (θ =∞, x) > W (θ = 0, x) . Thus,
W (θ =∞, x∗(θ = 0)) > W (θ =∞, x∗(θ =∞)) ,which is a contradiction of x∗(θ =∞) be-
ing the optimal R&D investment when θ =∞.Hence, it must be thatW (θ =∞, x∗(θ =∞)) >
W (θ = 0, x∗(θ = 0)), which implies that p0 (x|θ =∞) < p0 (x|θ = 0) and x∗(θ = ∞) >
x∗(θ = 0). The case where W (θ =∞, x∗(θ =∞)) = W (θ = 0, x∗(θ = 0)) cannot hold
from exactly the same argument12.
The simple intuition behind this proposition is that the firm is willing to invest more
in R&D, when private returns are higher.
In conclusion, a higher θ should intensify technological internalization and, therefore,
raise private returns. In case firms are aware of the eﬀect of θ on private returns, R&D
expenditures should rise in θ as well.
The rest of the paper empirically supports these theoretical predications. In the econo-
metric section, dynamic private returns (Wi) are specified as ∂Vi∂Ki , where Vi is the market
value of the inventing firm and Ki is its knowledge stock (which is approximated by cur-
rent and past stream of own R&D expenditures)13. Private returns are specified as a
function of θ, ∂Vi∂Ki = Θ(θ), and θ is empirically identified by measures of Internalized and
Externalized spillovers.
12Appendix A.1 shows that proposition 2.1 can be generalized for every θ.
13It is convenient to model private returns as the eﬀect of the knowledge of the inventing firm on its
market value, since markets are forward looking and should incorporate the dynamic consideration of
technological internalization developed in this paper.
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3. Methodology
This section discusses the conceptual issues that underpin the empirical framework of
measuring technological internalization. I start by presenting how the technological con-
tribution of an invention is measured. Then, spillovers are defined as the external ex-
ploitation of the technological contribution of the invention. Finally, it is shown how it is
determined whether spillovers feed back into the inventing firm to generate technological
internalization.
3.1. Identifying the technological contribution of an invention
I propose measuring the technological contribution of an invention in two dimensions.
The first is the number of lines of research the invention originates and the second is
the ‘quality’ of these lines of research. A line of research is defined as a sequence of
inventions, where every invention is a follow-up development of its immediate ancestor.
This sequence of inventions is required to be unique over a given time period, i.e., not to
be fully contained in a longer sequence of inventions. Define the first invention in the line
of research as an originating invention. A line of research is assumed to be of a higher
‘quality’, if the number of subsequent developments of the originating invention along the
line of research is higher.
More formally, the technological contribution of invention i, TCi, is computed as the
‘quality’-weighted count of the lines of research invention i originates, as following14:
TCi =
X
k∈Ki
LRk ×Qk (3.1)
Where, Ki is the set of lines of research originated in invention i, k indexes lines of
research in this set, LRk is a dummy that receives the value 1 for line of research k and
zero otherwise, and Qk is the ‘quality’ of line of research k, as measured by the number of
14Belenzon (2005) shows that this method of measuring technological contribution is equivalent to an
alternative approach of counting the number of oﬀspring inventions and weighing each one by the number
of direct citations received.
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inventions the line of research includes15.
Applying this formulation to the diﬀusion patterns in figure 1 yields:
TC1A = (1× 3) = 3 (3.2)
Where, TC1A is the technological contribution of invention A under pattern 1. The
term 1 in the brackets represents the singleton line of research A → B → C → D that
is adjusted by its ‘quality’, which is 3 (since it includes three subsequent developments of
invention A: B, C and D).
Similarly, the technological contribution of invention A under diﬀusion pattern 2, TC2A,
is:
TC2A = (1× 2) + (1× 2) = 4 (3.3)
The term 1 in the first brackets represents the line of research A → B → C that
is adjusted by its ‘quality’, which is 2 (since it includes two subsequent developments of
invention A: B and C). The term 1 in the second brackets represents the line of research
A → B → D that is adjusted by its ‘quality’, which is 2 as well (since it includes two
subsequent developments of invention A: B and D).
From this is concluded that the technological contribution of invention A under dif-
fusion pattern 2 is greater than its technological contribution under diﬀusion pattern 1
(intuitively, under both patterns of diﬀusion the number of subsequent developments is
equal. However, there are more research opportunities under pattern 2, as indicated by
the number of lines of research).
15Simply counting the number of inventions along a line of research may be an overestimate of the
technological contribution of the originating invention. A subsequent invention which is a high generation
of development of the originating invention is more likely to have benefited from other prior subsequent
inventions along the line of research. Thus, I always discount every generation by a discount factor of
δ per generation (which is assumed to be 15 percent), thus, Qk =
JX
j=1
δj−1, where, J is the number of
oﬀspring inventions in line of research k. Since the choice of the discount factor is arbitrary, other values
of δ are experimented with as robustness tests.
15
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Figure 2: Technological contribution
Figure 2: Circles in this figure represent inventions and arrows represent the direction
of knowledge flow. Pattern 1 illustrates a singleton path of knowledge flow, which is A→
B → C → D, while diﬀusion pattern 2 illustrates two unique paths of knowledge flows,
which are A → B → C and A → B → D. Determining the technological contribution of
invention A under the two diﬀusion patterns requires weighing these lines of research by
their ‘quality’, by measuring their length in terms of the number of inventions they include.
3.2. Measuring spillovers
Spillovers are defined as the external exploitation of the technological contribution of an
invention, where external refers to the set of firms that are diﬀerent from the inventing
firm. Following this definition, spillovers are measured as the number of external inventions
along the lines of research the originating invention inspires.
For illustration, it is useful to examine a slightly more complicated diﬀusion pattern, as
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shown in figure 2. Capital letters represent inventions, where arrows represent the direction
of knowledge flow. This figure plots the diﬀusion pattern of the originating invention A,
where the oﬀspring inventions are B, C, D, E, F , G, H, I and J . To complete the
presentation, the shape of each capital letter represents a diﬀerent firm, i.e., a circle firm
(the inventing firm), a triangle firm and a square firm.
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Figure 3: Measuring spillovers
Figure 3: This figure illustrates the diﬀusion pattern of the originating invention A.
Inventions are represented by a capital letter, while the firm that owns the inventions is
represented by a shape (e.g., the inventing firm is the circle, since it owns the originating
invention A). I define the spillovers created by invention A, given this diﬀusion pattern, as
the number of inventions that are owned by the square and triangle firms (all the firms in
the figure which are diﬀerent from the inventing firm) along the lines of research invention
A originates.
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Following the methodology presented above, in order to measure the technological
contribution of invention A, we need to identify the lines of research invention A originates
and weigh them by their ‘quality’. Since a line of research is defined as a singleton
sequence of subsequent developments of the originating knowledge, there are five such lines
of research: A→ B → D → H, A→ B → E → I, A→ C → F → I, A→ C → F → J
and A→ C → G→ J . The technological contribution of invention A following equation
(3.1) is given by:
TCA = (1× 3) + (1× 3) + (1× 3) + (1× 3) + (1× 3) = 15 (3.4)
Since spillovers are defined as the external inventions that compose the lines of research
an invention originates, they are formulated as:
Spilloversi =
X
k∈Ki
LRk × Sk (3.5)
Where, i is an originating invention, Ki is the set of lines of research invention i origi-
nates, k indexes lines of research in this set, LRk is a dummy that receives the value 1 for
line of research k and zero otherwise and Sk is the number of external inventions included
in line of research k. Following this formulation, the spillovers created by invention A are:
SpilloversA = (1× 3) + (1× 2) + (1× 2) + (1× 3) + (1× 3) = 13 (3.6)
Where, the second and third terms, (1× 2) and (1× 2) , correspond to the fact that
invention I is owned by the inventing firm. Thus, invention I is excluded from the spillovers
measure for invention A (the spillovers along lines of research A → B → E → I and
A→ C → F → I are based only on inventions B, E, C and F )16.
16In some patterns of diﬀusion, the first subsequent development of the originating knowledge is done by
the inventing firm (which is identified as a self-citation). Hence, knowledge does not immediately spread
to other inventors. In this case, the ‘in-house’ subsequent development is not measured as spillovers (where
spillovers along such lines of research occur only if in a future generation of development knowledge leaves
the boundaries of the inventing firm).
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Finally, I aim at distinguishing between two types of spillovers: spillovers that con-
tribute to the dynamic research of the inventing firm and spillovers that do not.
3.3. Internalized and Externalized lines of research
Two types of lines of research are identified: the first type is lines of research where the
originating knowledge leaves the inventing firm and returns to this firm after having been
further developed by other firms. The second type is lines of research where the originating
knowledge leaves the inventing firm and does not return. Spillovers along the former type
are internalized in the dynamic research of the inventing firm and, therefore, these lines of
research are defined as Internalized lines of research. However, spillovers along the latter
type do not contribute to the dynamic research of the inventing firm, therefore, these lines
of research are defined as Externalized lines of research.
Hence, the spillovers of an invention can be written as:
Spilloversi =
X
j∈Internalizedi
LRj × Sj +
X
t∈Externalizedi
LRt × St (3.7)
Where i denotes an originating invention, Internalizedi is the set of Internalized lines
of research originated in invention i, Externalizedi is the set of Externalized lines of
research originated in invention i, j indexes lines of research in the Internalizedi set and t
indexes lines of research in the Externalizedi set. I define the first term in the right-hand-
side of equation (3.7) as IntSpilli and the second term in the right-hand-side of equation
(3.7) as ExtSpilli. Thus, equation (3.7) becomes:
Spilloversi = IntSpilli +ExtSpilli (3.8)
In addition, IntSharei is defined as the ratio between IntSpilli and Spilloversi.
To illustrate this decomposition, it is useful to refer back to figure 2. Out of the five lines
of research that invention A originates, two are Internalized and three are Externalized.
The set InternalizedA is:
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InternalizedA = {A→ B → E → I,A→ C → F → I}
Similarly, the set ExternalizedA is:
ExternalizedA = {A→ B → D→ H,A→ C → F → J,A→ C → G→ J}
Given this decomposition, IntSpillA = (1× 2) + (1× 2) = 4 (two external inventions
in the first line of research and two external inventions in the second line of research in
the InternalizedA set).
Similarly, ExtSpillA = (1× 3) + (1× 3) + (1× 3) = 9 (three external inventions in
each of the three lines of research in the ExternalizedA set).
3.4. Empirical methodology
Inventions are empirically identified as patents and knowledge flows as citations (where
knowledge flows from the cited patent to the citing patent). Patents and citations data
contain significant noise and bias17. Nonetheless, these data also oﬀer unique information
on the diﬀusion pattern of knowledge and sequential innovation, which I believe to be
extremely useful for exploring the ideas developed in this paper.
Hence, inventions in figures 2 and 3 are empirically identified as patents, whereas
arrows are empirically identified as citations. For example, an arrow from invention A to
invention B in figures 2 and 3 reflects the fact that patent B cites patent A. The task I
am facing is to eﬀectively draw figure 2 for the set of originating inventions18.
A unique line of research is empirically identified as a singleton sequence of citations
(where, each patent cites its direct ancestor). As discussed above, a sequence of cita-
tions is defined as singleton, if it is not fully contained in a longer sequence of citations
17See, for example, Trajtenberg (1990) for the potential bias in patents as indicators for innovation
output, and Trajtenberg, Jaﬀe and Fogarty (2001) for a study on the noise component in citations as
indicators for knowledge flows.
18The design of this set is explained below.
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for the given time period being explored. After extracting the lines of research for the
sample of originating patents, each line of research is classified as either Internalized or
Externalized19.
The period for which lines of research are constructed is restricted to 15 years after the
grant year of the originating patent. For example, for a patent that was granted in 1975,
the youngest patents in all the lines of research it originates cannot be granted after 1990.
Further, citations along a line of research are added as long as the line of research has not
already been classified as Internalized20. Thus, this methodology extracts all the unique
trajectories where knowledge had left the boundaries of its inventor and returned to these
boundaries in a time period of 15 years after the knowledge had been created21, as well as
all the unique trajectories where knowledge had left the boundaries of the inventing firm
and did not return to these boundaries in the same time period22.
Since this paper exploits the firm-level variation in technological internalization, IntSpill,
ExtSpill and IntShare are aggregated to the firm level by the taking their mean over
the set of originating patents held by the inventing firms. For ease of notations, these
variables are not re-labeled. Hereafter, they refer to the firm-level aggregates.
19The reader who is familiar with the economics of patents literature can find the definition of an
Internalized line of research similar to a self-citation. A self-citation is the case where a firm develops its
prior knowledge directly (the first citation the patent receives is from the inventing firm). An Internalized
line of research is the case where the firm indirectly develops its prior knowledge, after it has been
developed by other firms. Thus, an Internalized line of research is a unique indirect self-citation, which I
associate with a higher appropriability, as the existing literature does with self-citations (e.g., Hall, Jaﬀe
and Trajtenberg (2005)).
20E.g., consider the Internalized line of research A→ B → E → I that is presented in figure 3. Assume
that patent I is cited by patent K, such that this line of research becomes A → B → E → I → K.
The imposed restriction implies that only the line of research A→ B → E → I will be extracted for the
originating patent A.
21Since I refer to the grant year of the patent and not to its application year, the creation date of the
patented knowledge is actually earlier. However, my algorithm builds on the fact that a citing patent
cannot be cited before it cites. This crucial feature of the data can be exploited only by referring to the
grant year of the patent (see Belenzon (2005) for detail on the algorithm).
22It is important to note that this methodology incorporates the case where knowledge is first developed
sequentially ‘in-house’ by the inventing firm (i.e., self-citations). In numerous cases the inventing firm
develops the first follow-up inventions of the originating knowledge. In such lines of research knowledge
leaves the boundaries of the inventing firm via a higher order generation of citation. These lines of research
are classified as Internalized or Externalized following the same criterion described above.
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4. Data
4.1. Diﬀusion data
Patents and citations data are taken from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce from the
NBER archive. The sample of patents and citations includes about 1.7 million citations
and 600,000 patents (which can appear as oﬀspring inventions)23. The set of originating
patents includes all patents granted between 1969 and 198024 that received at least one
citation during 1975-1995 (recall that all the direct and indirect citations the originating
patent receives are extracted for a period of 15 years since its grant year). These patents
must be held by the sample of firms for which complete accounting data are available
for the period 1980-2001 (IntSpill and ExtSpill are computed for patents from a pre-
estimation period. It is assumed that the pattern of diﬀusion of this set of inventions
is a time invariant characteristic of the firm25). This set of originating patents includes
104,694 patents26 (see appendix A.2.1 for more detail). Detail on the algorithm developed
to construct the diﬀusion data is provided in Belenzon (2005).
Table 1 describes the variation of lines of research across technology sectors and time.
The largest number of lines of research per citation received by an originating patent
is in the “Electrical and Electronics” sector. This may indicate a high technological
23The set of citing patents includes all patents held by the US Compustat firms that were matched
to the USPTO by Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2001), and made at least one citation. This set includes
about 30 percent of all citing patents in the USPTO (and 50 percent of US citing patents).
24The year 1969 is the earliest year for which there is citations information for the patents held by the
firms in the sample. Also, in practice I could extract the diﬀusion pattern of patents that were granted
up to 1985, since the citations data goes up to 1999. However, there is a huge spike in the number of
citations in 1995 (see figure A3), where the number of citations rises by around 800,000 in the period
1995-1999. In addition to the feasibly of extracting sequences of citations from these huge data, there is
also a concern that the explosion in citations in this period is not associated with stronger learning and
sequential innovation, but with changes in the patenting behavior of firms, which could contaminate the
results.
25There is a trade-oﬀ between constructing time varying diﬀusion variables and correctly measuring
IntSpill and ExtSpill. In case the 15 years horizon for which sequences of citations are extracted for
every patent is reduced, more periods for the construction of IntSpill and ExtSpill would be observed.
However, when analyzing a short diﬀusion period the lines of research are more likely to be Externalized,
as knowledge has less time to return to the inventing firm.
26This set includes 45 percent of all cited patents between 1969 and 1980 that are held by US Compustat
firms that were matched to the USPTO by Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2001).
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complexity in this sector, where complexity refers to the various distinct ways along which
knowledge can be sequentially developed27. About 7.6 percent of the lines of research are
Internalized. This share appears to be rather stable over time, with an exception in “Drugs
and Medicals”. In the period 1978-1980 there is a large drop in the share of Internalized
lines of research in this sector, which may be associated with the Biomed revolution that
took place at the end of the 70’s. I plan to investigate this separately in a future research.
4.2. Accounting data
The accounting data (sales, R&D, capital, etc.) and market value data are taken from US
Compustat for the period 1980-2001 and are merged to the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Oﬃce data from the NBER archive28. Only firms that were cited during the diﬀusion
period were included in the sample, leaving an unbalanced panel of about 500 firms in the
period 1980-2001 and a total of 9,454 observations. The final sample includes the largest
patenting firms in the US. The average number of years firms are active in the sample is 18.5
(and the median is 21). I find it important to focus the analysis on long surviving firms, due
to the interest of studying the eﬀect of technological internalization on firms that wish to
remain at the frontier of the technology they originate. Otherwise, Externalized spillovers
could capture exit of firms (since firms that exit will have only Externalized spillovers
from the date they exit onwards), which will change the interpretation of technological
internalization29. Appendix A.2 provides detail on the construction of this sample.
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for IntSpill, ExtSpill and InShare as
well as for the main accounting variables. The correlation between IntSpill and ExtSpill
27For example, technology field 438 (Semiconductor Device Manufacturing: Process) in the “Electrical
and Electronics” sector has on average 112.3 lines of research per citation received by an originating
patent. On the other hand, technology field 139 (Textiles: Weaving) in the “Chemicals” sector has only
of 5.1 such lines of research.
28The matching between assignee names and Compustat firms is taken from Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg
(2001).
29It would be interesting to analyze the eﬀect of technological internalization on exit, however, this is
not studied in this paper.
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is 0.365 (which implies that firms that create more Internalized spillovers also create more
Externalized spillovers). About 40 percent of firms do not create Internalized spillovers at
all, whereas all firms create Externalized spillovers.
5. Estimation
This section presents the estimation results of the eﬀects of IntSpill and ExtSpill on the
market value and R&D expenditures of the firm. I start by showing that these variables
matter for the market valuation of the R&D stock of the firm. Findings that technological
internalization matters for market value may imply that it also matters for the R&D
decisions of firms. I test this hypothesis by estimating a R&D expenditures equation.
5.1. Market value equation
In order to estimate the eﬀect of technological internalization on private returns, a simple
version of the value function approach proposed by Griliches (1981)30 is adopted. The
market value of firm i at period t, Vit, takes the following form:
Vit = κit (Ait + γKit) (5.1)
Where, Ait denotes physical assets, Kit is the R&D stock (representing knowledge
stock), γ is the shadow price of the R&D stock (higher values of γ indicate that the
market valuation of the knowledge stock relative to physical stock rises)31. The parameter
γ captures the private returns to innovation, which are defined as the change in market
value as a response to a change in the R&D stock of the firm. γ is modeled as a linear
function of IntSpill and ExtSpill32:
γ = γ0 + γ1 (IntSpilli) + γ2 (ExtSpilli) (5.2)
30See also Jaﬀe (1986), Hall et al (2005) or Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004).
31A constant returns in the market value function has been assumed, consistently with previous studies.
32Specifications where IntShare is included instead of IntSpill and ExtSpill are also reported.
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I expect γ1 to be positive and γ2 to be negative (the theoretical predication is that pri-
vate returns rise with θ, empirically captured by a higher IntSpill and a lower ExtSpill).
Taking logarithms and dividing by Ait, the left-hand-side of equation (5.1) becomes the
traditional Tobin’s average Q, where its deviation from unity depends on the ratio between
the R&D stock to the tangible stock
¡
K
A
¢
, IntSpill, ExtSpill and κit, as following:
log
µ
Vit
Ait
¶
= log κit + log
µ
1 + γ
Kit
Ait
¶
(5.3)
Finally, κit is specified as:
log κit = Z 0itβ0 + β1 log (1 + IntSpilli) + β2 log (1 +ExtSpilli) + τ t + ηi + it (5.4)
Where, Zit is a vector of controls (such as industry and technology dummies, sales,
patents stock, etc.), τ t is a complete set of time dummies, ηi is the firm fixed-eﬀect,
which is discussed later in this section, and it is an idiosyncratic error term. The linear
terms of IntSpill and ExtSpill are included in the specification mainly as controls for
their interaction with the R&D stock. Since IntSpill has many zero values, a dummy for
IntSpill equals zero is always included.
Thus, the following equation is estimated by non-linear least squares (where standard
errors are clustered by firms):
log
µ
Vit
Ait
¶
= Z 0itβ0 + β1 log (1 + IntSpilli) + β2 log (1 +ExtSpilli) (5.5)
+ log
µ
1 + (γ0 + γ1 (IntSpilli) + γ2 (ExtSpilli))
Kit
Ait
¶
+ τ t + ηi + it
5.2. R&D equation
A R&D equation is estimated in order to test whether IntSpill and ExtSpill aﬀect the
R&D decision of firms, as predicted by proposition 2.1 (intuitively, in case technological
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internalization raises private returns, we should find firms with higher technological in-
ternalization, on average, investing more in R&D). I estimate the firm fixed-eﬀects in the
R&D equation (a complete set of firm dummies), and project the estimated firm fixed-
eﬀects on IntSpill and ExtSpill.
The R&D equation that is estimated is:
logR&Dit = αi +X 0itβ + it (5.6)
Where, R&Dit is the R&D expenditures of firm i in period t, αi is the firm fixed-
eﬀect, Xit is a vector of controls for sales and patents variables and it is an idiosyncratic
error term. The sales variables (current and lagged) aim to capture demand shocks that
may aﬀect R&D incentives. The patents stock (weighed by citations) can aﬀect the R&D
decision of the firm in various ways. One possibility is that patents capture the intellectual
property protection the firm faces, so that a larger patent portfolio raises the incentive to
perform R&D. I also estimate a dynamic specification by adding R&Dit−1 in the right-
hand-side of equation (5.6).
Based on the estimates obtained from the R&D equation, bαi is projected in the second
stage on IntSpill and ExtSpill:
bαi = δ1 log (1 + IntSpilli) + δ2 (1 +ExtSpilli) + δ3X 0i + νi (5.7)
Where, Xi is the mean of Xit over the estimation period (1980-2001) and νi is the error
term. δ1 is expected to be positive and δ2 is expected to be negative33. Since IntSpill has
many zero values, a dummy for IntSpill equals zero is always included.
33In addition, the estimation results of including only IntShare are reported. IntShare is expected to
have a positive eﬀect on bαi.
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5.3. Preliminary issues for the market value estimation
5.3.1. Dealing with cross-industry variation
Firms in the sample are located in diﬀerent industries. These industries may vary in private
returns and technological internalization. Hence, a pooling estimation across industries
may capture industry variation in private returns, via IntSpill and ExtSpill. I cope
with this concern in various ways. In all the specifications reported below, complete sets
of two-digit industry dummies and main technology sector indicators are included34. The
technology indicators are the share of the firm’s patents in each of the five main technology
sectors. Moreover, small sample evidences are presented for three specific heterogenous
industries.
Table 3 looks at the variation of the diﬀusion variables across four levels of industry
aggregation. The analysis of the variation of the diﬀusion variables shows that the main
variation comes from within industries, mainly for IntSpill and ExtSpill (IntShare ap-
pears to be more sensitive to industry eﬀects, however, about 50 percent of its variation
is still evident within four-digit industry breakdown). This finding is encouraging, since it
is more likely that the source of variation in technological internalization is not strongly
associated with industry location.
5.3.2. Endogeniety
The use of firm level accounting data may lead to the classical endogeniety bias in the
R&D stock. A higher market value can, indeed, be the result of conducting more R&D,
however, the ability to devote more resources to R&D can reflect a higher market value
that provides more finance to the innovative activity. Moreover, demand or supply shocks
can simultaneously raise the R&D expenditures and the market value of the firm. In
order to mitigate this potential bias, a complete set of year dummies is included, aiming at
34The estimation results of a linearized version of equation (5.5) with a complete set of four-digit SIC
dummies are also reported.
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capturing transitory shocks35. Further, mymain interest is to recover the eﬀects of IntSpill
and ExtSpill, which are less sensitive to the endogeniety of the accounting variables.
A more serious endogeniety bias may be associated with IntSpill and ExtSpill, as
there is an overlap in the period used for their construction and the estimation period36.
In order to test the sensitivity of the findings, I experiment with diﬀerent time periods for
the construction of IntSpill and ExtSpill, so as to reduce the overlap with the estimation
period37. The pattern of results is robust to the diﬀerent time periods.
5.3.3. Firm fixed-eﬀects
I do not control for firm fixed-eﬀects in the market value equation by including a complete
set of firm dummies from two main reasons: first, under the assumption of eﬃcient mar-
kets, changes in market value should not be predicted (especially by common observable
characteristics, such as R&D stock)38. Second, IntSpill and ExtSpill are time-invariant.
Thus, in the presence of firm dummies, the only way to identify their eﬀect is via the vari-
ation in their interaction with the R&D stock. Since the R&D stock is rather persistent
over time within firms, in practice, there is no significant eﬀect of IntSpill and ExtSpill
when a complete set of firm dummies is included.
Therefore, I control for firm fixed-eﬀects by adopting the “mean scaling” approach
developed by Blundell, Griﬃth and Van Reenen (1999). Their method assumes that
computing the mean of Tobin’s Q in a long enough pre-estimation period can be used as an
initial condition to proxy for unobserved heterogeneity, if the first moment is stationary. In
order to amplify the eﬀectiveness of this method and test its robustness, I also include the
pre-estimation means of other firm-level variables, such as sales, industry sales, employees,
R&D stock, citations-weighted patents stock and citations stock39. The pre-sample means
35I also experiment with lagging the R&D stock by one period, which yields similar results.
36The estimation period is 1980-2001, whereas the diﬀusion variables are constructed for the period
1969-1995.
37IntSpill and ExtSpill are also constructed for the periods: 1969-1990, 1969-1985 and 1969-1980.
38Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2005) reach a similar conclusion.
39Including the mean of additional right-hand side variable is also important since they are computed
for a similar period used for the construction of IntSpill and ExtSpill. For example, in case technological
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of the accounting variables are constructed from US Compustat for the period 1970-1979
for the 476 firms in the estimation sample.
5.4. Estimation results for Tobin’s Q
All the Tobin’s Q specifications include a complete set of two-digit industry dummies (79
dummy variables), a set of indicators for the share of patents the firm has in each of the
five main technology sectors, a complete set of year dummies (21 dummy variables), a
dummy variable that receives the value one if the R&D stock of the firm is zero and a
dummy variable that receives the value one if IntSpill is zero.
Table 4 reports the estimation results of equation (5.5). Column 1 includes the linear
term of R&D over assets and its interaction terms with IntSpill and ExtSpill. The
coeﬃcient on the linear term of R&D over assets (γ0) is positive and significant (0.280
with a standard error of 0.079). The coeﬃcient on the interaction term of IntSpill with
R&D over assets (γ1) is positive and significant (0.208 with a standard error of 0.095),
while the coeﬃcient on the interaction term of ExtSpill with R&D over assets (γ2) is
negative and significant (-0.011 with a standard error of 0.003). These findings support
the expectation that private returns rise with technological internalization.
Given these estimates, the elasticity of market value with respect to the R&D stock,
evaluated at the sample mean, is 0.10340. This implies that an additional one dollar
spent on R&D raises market value by 0.49 dollar (referred to as private returns). A one
standard deviation increase in IntSpill raises private returns to 0.63 dollar (thus, a 30
percent increase), whereas a one standard deviation increase in ExtSpill lowers private
returns to 0.44 dollar (thus, a 10 percent decrease)41.
internalization is higher when the firm has more originating patents, including only the patents stock in
the estimation period is not suﬃcient.
40The estimated elasticity is lower from that reported in previous studies. For example, Bloom,
Schankerman and Van Reenen (2005) report an elasticity of 0.24, using a similar estimation sample
without industry or technology eﬀects.
41The estimated eﬀects of IntSpill and ExtSpill on private returns are underestimated, as it is assumed
that a change in either measures is independent from the other. For example, it is likely that an increase
in IntSpill will reduce ExtSpill as well (thus, a line of research becomes Internalized instead of being
Externalized). This indicates that private returns will rise as a result of the increase in IntSpill and also
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In column 2, the pre-sample means are added42. The coeﬃcient on the linear term of
R&D stock over assets halves (from 0.280 to 0.145) and remains significant. The coeﬃcient
on the interaction term of IntSpill with the R&D stock over assets drops from 0.208 to
0.096, but it remains significant, while the coeﬃcient on the interaction term between
ExtSpill and the R&D stock over assets drops in absolute value (from -0.011 to -0.005)
and remains significant as well43.
Based on the estimates from column 2, the elasticity of market value with respect
to the R&D stock, evaluated at the sample mean, is 0.056 (compared to 0.103 without
pre-sample means). An additional one dollar spent on R&D raises market value by 0.26
dollar (compared to 0.49 dollar without the pre-sample means). A one standard devia-
tion increase in IntSpill raises these private returns to 0.34 dollar, while a one standard
deviation increase in ExtSpill lowers private returns to 0.24 dollar.
In column 3, IntSpill and ExtSpill are added linearly. The same pattern of results
holds. The main change is a drop in the coeﬃcient on the interaction term of IntSpill
(from 0.096 to 0.059), which remains significant. The coeﬃcient on the linear term of
IntSpill is positive and significant, while the coeﬃcient on the linear term of ExtSpill
is negative and significant, both as expected. Importantly, the positive eﬀect of IntSpill
and the negative eﬀect of ExtSpill are identified linearly and through their interaction
with the R&D stock over assets.
In columns 4 and 5, the sales of the firm, the aggregate sales in the industry the firm
operates in and the growth in the sales of the firm are added (see appendix A.2 for detail
on their construction). The same pattern of results with respect to IntSpill and ExtSpill
(linear and interacted terms) remains. The eﬀects of Sales and Sales Growth are positive
and significant and the eﬀect of Industry Sales is negative and significant.
as a result of a decrease in ExtSpill.
42The set of pre-sample means is jointly significant with a p-value<0.001.
43I also interact the pre-sample mean of Tobin’s Q with R&D over assets, in order to test the robustness
of the interaction terms of IntSpill and ExtSpill. The coeﬃcient on the interacted term of IntSpill rises
to 0.112 with a standard error of 0.019 and the coeﬃcient on the interacted term of ExtSpill is -0.006
with a standard error of 0.001.
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Table A2 reports the same estimations for IntShare. The eﬀect of IntShare on market
value is always positive and significant.
Table 5 summarizes the quantitative eﬀects of IntSpill, ExtSpill and IntShare on
private returns in terms of percentage point changes in market value as a response to
a 1 dollar increase in R&D expenditures, evaluated at the mean (the columns in table 5
correspond to the same columns in tables 3 and A2). Including pre-sample means does not
change the eﬀect of IntSpill and ExtSpill (comparing column 1 to column 2), however, it
raises the eﬀect of IntShare. Adding the linear terms IntSpill, ExtSpill and IntShare
(column 3) substantially lowers the eﬀect of the interaction terms.
5.5. Estimation results for the R&D equation
Table 6 reports the estimation results for equations (5.6) and (5.7)44. I explore two speci-
fications: first, only IntSpill and ExtSpill are included, aiming at identifying the extent
cross-firm variation in the time-invariant component in the R&D decision is attributed to
technological internalization. Second, the means of the first-stage variable in the period
1980-2001 are added.
Column1 reports the results from the first-stage estimation for the static specification.
Current and lagged sales have a positive eﬀect on R&D expenditures, where the eﬀect of
industry sales is positive and significant only for the current term. A possible interpretation
of the positive eﬀect of sales on R&D expenditures is transitory shocks which raise the
sales (both of the firm and its competitors) and the incentive to innovate. The citations-
weighted patents stock has a positive and significant eﬀect on R&D expenditures. This
is consistent with the expectation that the citations-weighed patent stock captures higher
appropriation through stronger intellectual property protection, which raises the incentive
to perform R&D.
44In the dynamic specifications, the long-run fixed-eﬀect is computed as bα1−0.568 , where 0.568 is the
coeﬃcient on the lag of R&D.
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Column 2 reports the estimation of a dynamic specification of the R&D equation. A
similar pattern of results holds, with the exception that the coeﬃcient on lagged sales is
negative and significant.
In column 3, the firm fixed-eﬀects obtained from the first-stage static estimation are
projected on IntSpill and ExtSpill. The eﬀect of IntSpill is positive and significant,
whereas the eﬀect of ExtSpill is negative and significant, both as expected. The R2 is
0.39, which indicates that about forty percent of the between-firm variation in the R&D
decision can be explained by technological internalization. In column 4, the means over
the estimation period of the first-stage variables are added. The coeﬃcients on IntSpill
and ExtSpill drop, however, they keep their signs and remain significant.
Columns 5 and 6 report the equivalent estimation results for the fixed—eﬀects from the
dynamic specification. The same pattern of results holds.
Finally, columns 7 to 10 report the same estimation for IntShare, which show similar
results.
Based on the static estimations, a one standard deviation increase in IntSpill raises
R&D expenditures by 33 percent, whereas a one standard deviation increase in ExtSpill
lowers R&D expenditures by 5 percent. Further, a one standard deviation increase in
IntShare raises R&D expenditures by 38 percent. Thus, the quantitative eﬀects of In-
ternalized spillovers are large, whereas the eﬀect of Externalized spillovers is much lower.
This implies that what matters most for the R&D decision of the inventing firm is the
spillovers that feed back into its research, rather spillovers that do not45.
45I also estimate the eﬀect of IntSpill, ExtSpill and IntShare on R&D expenditures in a one stage,
where these variables are added to the first stage estimation reported above. For the static estimation,
the coeﬃcients on log(1+IntSpill) and IntShare are positive and significant (0.133 with a standard error
0.032, and 0.037 with a standard error 0.018, respectively), however, the coeﬃcient on log(1 +ExtSpill)
is not significant (0.006 with a standard error of 0.021). The same pattern of results holds for a dynamic
specification.
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5.6. Robustness tests
Table 7 reports the robustness tests for the Tobin’s Q estimation, using column 5 in table
4 as a benchmark.
The first robustness test relates to the concern that IntSpill and ExtSpill capture the
patenting activity of the firm (instead of technological internalization), such that firms
that have more patents will have higher IntSpill and lower ExtSpill (as the firm has
more patents, the probability that it will randomly indirectly cite its previous patents is
higher)46. The same pattern of results regarding IntSpill and ExtSpill can arise under
this interpretation, if patents have a positive eﬀect on private returns. In column 1, the
citations-weighted patents stock is added. In case IntSpill and ExtSpill simply capture
the patenting activity of the firm, they should be uninformative in this specification. I
find the same pattern of results regarding IntSpill and ExtSpill, for the linear terms
and the interacted terms. The coeﬃcient on the interaction term of the citations-weighted
patents stock is positive and significant, which is consistent with the higher appropriability
interpretation.
The second robustness test relates to the size of the firm in the product market, aiming
at mitigating the concern that larger firms are better at performing sequential innovation
and capturing higher private returns. The same reasoning as for patenting activity is
pursued, accordingly, IntSpill and ExtSpill should not be informative in the presence of
product market size variables. As the linear terms of the size of the firm in the product
market are already included, the R&D stock is interacted with Market Share. The same
pattern of results regarding IntSpill and ExtSpill still remains.
Next, I test the robustness of the findings to including the classical measure of the
external R&D stock of the firm (originally introduced by Jaﬀe, 1986), labeled as R&D Pool
(appendix A.2 provides detail on its construction), as reported in column 3. Omitting R&D
Pool may cause IntSpill to be upward biased and ExtSpill to be downward biased, from
two main reasons. First, a higher R&D Pool can imply stronger competition in research.
46The correlation between IntSpill and citations-weighted patents stock is 0.173.
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Thus, R&D Pool should have a negative eﬀect on Tobin’s Q. Under this interpretation,
a higher R&D Pool should make it harder for the inventing firm to perform sequential
innovation. Thus, technological internalization is upward biased. Second, a higher R&D
Pool can imply stronger knowledge externalities, thus, the inventing firm can learn from
the R&D that surrounds it. In this case, we should expect R&D Pool to positively aﬀect
Tobin’s Q. Also, sequential innovation should be easier in case knowledge externalities
intensify. Thus, technological internalization is overestimated in this case as well.
There is a positive and significant eﬀect of R&D Pool on Tobin’s Q via the interaction
term with the R&D stock, and a negative, but not significant, linear eﬀect. These results
confirm the countervailing eﬀects of R&D Pool on Tobin’s Q: a positive learning eﬀect
through the R&D stock, and a negative linear competition eﬀect47. However, technological
internalization does not appear to be biased when R&D Pool is excluded, as there is no
important change in IntSpill and ExtSpill.
In column 4, citations-weighted patents stock, market share and R&D Pool (interacted
and linear) are all included together. The same pattern of results regarding IntSpill and
ExtSpill remains4849.
5.7. Estimation results for three specific industries
Since the above findings are based on a pooling estimation across industries, a big concern
is that the diﬀusion variables capture variation in private returns across industries (instead
of between-firms technological internalization). In order to mitigate this concern, I have
controlled for industry eﬀects, by including a complete set of two-digit industry dummies as
47Jaﬀe (1986) finds a similar negative linear eﬀect of R&D Pool on market value, which he interprets
as a negative competition eﬀect in the technology space.
48I have also experimented with including self-citations (linearly and interacted with the R&D stock
over assets), under the conjecture that self-citations represent an ability of the firm to conduct sequential
innovation. In all specifications, the same pattern of results remains. With respect to self-citations, only
the linear term is positive and significant.
49A linear version of equation (5.5) was also estimated with a complete set of four-digit SIC dummies.
Only the coeﬃcients on the interaction terms of IntSpill and ExtSpill remain significant (0.071 with a
standard error of 0.021 and -0.008 with a standard error of 0.002, respectively).
34
a default in all specifications (in addition to main technology sector shares). Nevertheless,
even if the cross-industry variation could be captured by two-digit industry dummies,
they are included only linearly and not interacted with the R&D stock over assets (i.e.,
the linear industry eﬀects are only an approximation of the cross-industry variation in
private returns and technological internalization).
In this section, I estimate the eﬀect of IntSpill and ExtSpill on Tobin’s Q and R&D
expenditures in three small panels, which diﬀer in the importance they place on sequential
innovation (appendix A.2 lists the industries that are included in each panel). Panel A
includes all firms (from the sample of inventing firms) that operate in the “Semiconductors”
industry. Sequential innovation plays a central role in this highly complex industry and
I expect the diﬀusion variables to matter the most (this panel includes 12 firms that
are active on average for 20 years)50. Panel B includes firms in the “Computers and
Communications” industry (this sample includes 25 firms that are active on average for
20 years)51. Finally, panel C includes the firms in the “Drugs and Medicals” industry (this
sample includes 19 firms that are active on average for 19 years). As sequential innovation
plays a minor role in this industry, the diﬀusion variables should not matter much in this
panel.
Table 8 summarizes the results, where the upper section reports the Tobin’s Q es-
timation and the lower section reports the R&D estimation. Regarding Tobin’s Q, the
strongest results are in the “Semiconductors” panel. In this panel, the eﬀect of the inter-
action term of IntSpill is positive and significant, where the eﬀect of the interaction term
of ExtSpill is negative and significant. When moving to the “Computers and Communi-
cations” panel, a similar pattern of results is observed. The interaction term of IntSpill is
positive and significant, where the interaction term of ExtSpill is negative and significant
(it is significant only in the specification with pre-sample means). Finally, in the “Drugs
and Medicals” panel there is no significant eﬀect of either IntSpill or ExtSpill.
50See Hall and Ziedonis (2001) for an analysis of the innovation and patenting activity in the “Semi-
conductors” industry.
51Note that panel A is a subset of panel B.
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In the R&D specifications (static and dynamic) a similar pattern of results holds.
Technological internalization matters for R&D expenditures in the “Semiconductors” and
“Computers and Communications” panels, but does not matter in the “Drugs and Med-
icals” panel.
Overall, technological internalization matters the most in the industries where sequen-
tial innovation plays a central role. In these industries we should expect the theoretical
predications to bind.
6. Summary and conclusions
This paper shows that firms are able to internalize dynamically some of their knowledge
that spills to other firms. I exploit the firm-level variation of this internalization, through
estimating the market valuation of the R&D stock of the firm. There is strong evidence
suggesting that private returns rise with Internalized spillovers and fall with Externalized
spillovers. Evaluated at the mean, a one standard deviation increase in IntSpill raises
the market valuation of an additional dollar spent on R&D by 30 percent, whereas a one
standard deviation increase in ExtSpill lowers the market valuation of an additional dollar
spent on R&D by 10 percent.
In addition to quantifying the eﬀect of technological internalization on private returns,
the findings from the market value estimation also suggest that firms themselves are aware
of their technological internalization and take it into consideration when making R&D
decisions. To test this, a R&D equation is estimated, which shows that firms that create
more Internalized and less Externalized spillovers, on average, invest substantially more
in R&D (e.g., evaluated at the mean, a one standard deviation increase in IntSpill raises
R&D expenditures by 33 percent).
Finding that the R&D decision of the firm is aﬀected by the pattern of diﬀusion
its inventions follow has important implications for the endogenous growth literature.
Spillovers encourage the innovation activity of the receivers of knowledge, however, their
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eﬀect on the incentive to create knowledge at the first place depends on whether they are
Internalized or Externalized. Suppose there are two economies that are identical in all
dimensions, but in the first economy technological internalization is stronger. Based on
the findings of this paper, innovation and, therefore, growth should be higher in the first
economy
Moreover, the firm-level variation in technological internalization this paper has shown
to exist may be linked to strategic behavior of firms optimizing the diﬀusion of their
knowledge. To the extent technological internalization is subject to the behavior of firms
has an important consequence for the way we model and think about knowledge spillovers.
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A. Appendices
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Figure A1: An example for an Externalized line of research
Figure A1: This figure shows a unique line of research originated in invention 3,836,478,
which is owned by IBM (the inventing firm). Since knowledge did not return to IBM in
the period 1974-1989, this line of research is Externalized.
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Figure A2: An example for an Internalized line of research
Figure A2: This figure shows a unique line of research originated in invention 4,131,983,
which is owned by Texas Instruments (the inventing firm). Since knowledge returned to
Texas Instruments in the period 1979-1994, this line of research is Internalized.
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Figure A3: This figure presents the number of citations made and received by patents
in our sample. The upward sloping graph shows the number of citations made each year,
where the U shaped curve shows the number of citations received each year.
A.1. Generalizing proposition 2.1
This section shows that proposition (2.1) holds for every θ, i.e., R&D rises continuously
with θ. The modified dynamic returns as a function of θ (following equation (2.6)) are:
Wi(θ) =
(1− q) p(x)v − x
(1− p(x)) (1− q)
Ã
1−
µ
q
1− (1− q) p(x)
¶θ+1!
(A.1)
Since Wxx < 0 (the second derivative with respect to x), comparative statics imply:
dx
dθ
= sign(Wxθ) (A.2)
Diﬀerentiating equation (A.1) with respect to x yields:
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And diﬀerentiating equation (A.2) with respect to θ yields:
Wxθ = p0 (x)
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Since q
1−p(x)(1−q) < 1, for Wxθ to be positive it is enough to show that the following
condition holds: µ
ln
q
1− p (x) (1− q)
¶
>
1
θ + 1
(A.5)
For θ = 0 condition (A.5) holds as q > 0. Since the right-hand-side of condition (A.5)
decreases with θ, it must hold for every θ.
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A.2. Data
The sample combines data mainly from two datasets:
The NBER USPTO patents database includes detailed patenting and citations
information for around 2,600 US firms (as described in Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2001))
and a list of all the citations made in the period 1975-1999.
The Compustat North-America dataset provides full accounts data for over
25,000 US firms from 1980 to 2001. This provides information on the key accounting
information of R&D, fixed assets, employment, sales, etc.
I started by matching the Compustat accounting data to the USPTO data, and kept
firms with 1 or more patents in the period 1969-1980 that received at least one citation
from the 2,600 firms in the NBER USPTO data set between 1975 and 1995. This leaves a
sample of 512 firms. The accounting dataset has been ‘cleaned’ to remove accounting years
with extremely large jumps (>+200% or <-66%) in sales, employment or capital signaling
merger and acquisition activity, leaving 476 firms and a total of 9,454 observations.
A.2.1. The sample of originating patents
The set of originating patents (the set of inventions whose diﬀusion pattern is constructed)
includes all cited patents that were granted between 1969 and 1980 and are held by the
Compustat firms for which accounting data between 1980 and 2001 are available. The
citations these patents receive must come from patents held by the 2,600 US Compustat
firms between 1975 and 1995 (the set of citing patents includes 599,884 patents, which
are about 30 percent of all citing patents and 50 percent of the US citing patents in the
USPTO). The set of originating patents includes 104,694 patents.
Using about 1.7 million citations as technological links (where 599,884 patents cite
573,373 patents in the sample), 13,107,634 lines of research (singleton sequences of cita-
tions) are extracted, which are originated in 97,921 inventions52. 999,718 lines of research
are classified as Internalized (7.6 percent of the total lines of research) and are origi-
nated in 29,964 patents (about 30 percent of the originating patents), while the remainder
12,107,916 lines of research are classified as Externalized and are originated in 97,212
patents53.
A.2.2. Constructing the accounting variables
The book value of capital is the net stock of property, plant and equipment (Compustat
Mnemonic PPENT); Employment is the number of employees (EMP). R&D (XRD) is used
526,773 patents that appear in our initial set of originating patents do not originate Internalized or
Externalized lines of research. These patents originate lines of research in which all the follow-up devel-
opments of the originating invention is done within the boundaries of the inventing firm.
53The remaining 709 originating patents inspire only Internalized lines research (thus, all the subsequent
generations of developments are done by the inventing firm).
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to create R&D capital stocks calculated using a perpetual inventory method with a 15%
depreciation rate (Hall et al, 2005). The citations-weighted patent stock was constructed
by normalizing the number of patents the firm owns according to the number of citations
it receives and the average number of citations to all patents in the same year. Given this
normalized patents count the stock is constructed using the perpetual inventory method.
The citations stock (used as a pre-estimation control) was constructed equivalently to the
R&D stock. For Tobin’s Q, firm value is the sum of the values of common stock, preferred
stock, total debt net of current assets (Mnemonics MKVAF, PSTK, DT and ACT). Book
value of capital includes net plant, property and equipment, inventories, investments in
unconsolidated subsidiaries and intangibles other than R&D (Mnemonics PPENT, INVT,
IVAEQ, IVAO and INTAN). Tobin’s Q was set to 0.1 for values below 0.1 and at 20 for
values above 20. See also Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004).
R&D Poolit is constructed as:
R&D Poolit = Σj,j 6=iTECij(R&D Stockjt) (A.6)
Where, the index j represents firms that operate in overlapping technology sectors to
firm i and TECij is the classical measure of the level of orthogonality in research between
firms i and j, originally developed by Jaﬀe (1986), and is defined as:
TECij =
(TiT
/
j )
(TiT
/
i )
1
2 (TjT
/
j )
1
2
(A.7)
Where, T is a vector that its elements are the firm’s share of patents in the three-digit
technology sectors. The technology space information is provided by the allocation of
all patents by the USPTO into 426 diﬀerent technology classes. I use the average share
of patents per firm in each technology class over the period 1970 to 2001 to create the
following vector for each firm: Ti = (Ti,1, Ti,2, ...Ti,426), where Ti,m is the share of patents
of firm i in technology class m.
Industry Salesit is defined as the aggregate sales of other firms facing firm i (denoted
by the index j), which operate in overlapping product markets, as following:
Industry Salesit = Σj,j 6=iSICij(Salesjt) (A.8)
Where, SICij is defined following Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2005), as:
SICij =
(SiS
/
j )
(SiS
/
i )
1
2 (SjS
/
j )
1
2
(A.9)
Where, S is a vector that its elements are the share of the firm’s sales in the lines
of business at the four-digit industry SIC codes. I use average share of sales per SIC
code within each firm over the period as our measure of activity by product market,
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Si = (Si,1, Si,2, ...Si,597), where Si,m is the share of sales of firm i in the four-digits SIC
code m. The degree of orthogonality between every pair of firms is then computed (where
higher orthogonality implies higher product market proximity). The normalization by the
vector size aims to control for product diversity.
Industry price deflators were taken from Bartelsman, Becker and Gray, 2000, until 1996
and from the BEA 4-digit NAICS Shipment Price Deflators afterwards. Finally, Market
Share is simply computed as the ratio between Sales and Industry Sales.
Finally, the industries considered in table 8 are as following: Semiconductors in panel
(A) (which is a subset of panel (B)) covers only SIC 3674 (Semiconductors and Related De-
vices). Computers and Communications in panel (B) covers SIC 3571 (Electronic Comput-
ers), 3572 (Computer Storage Devices), 3661 (Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus), 3663
(Radio and Television Broadcasting and Communications Equipment), 3669 (Communica-
tions Equipment, Not Elsewhere Classified), 3674 (Semiconductors and Related Devices),
5065 (Electronic Parts and Equipment, Not Elsewhere Classified) and 5731 (Radio, Televi-
sion, and Consumer Electronics Stores). Drugs and Medicals in panel (C) covers SIC 2834
(Pharmaceutical Preparations), 2835 (In Vitro and In Vivo Diagnostic Substances), 2844
(Perfumes, Cosmetics, and Other Toilet Preparations), 2851 (Paints, Varnishes, Lacquers,
Enamels, and Allied Products), 3841 (Surgical and Medical Instruments and Apparatus),
3842 (Orthopedic, Prosthetic, and Surgical Appliances and Supplies), 3845 (Electromed-
ical and Electrotherapeutic Apparatus) and 3851 (Ophthalmic Goods).
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A.3. The Algorithm
This paper develops an algorithm that will generate a “family tree” for every originating
patent in our sample. Since the computational task is highly complex and demanding,
the eﬃciency of the algorithm plays a major role in making the task feasible. This section
discusses the main steps of the algorithm. For the interested reader, a more detailed
description is available upon request.
A.3.1. Source File
The source file contains the raw data, taken from the USPTONBERPatents and Citations
database. This file includes 1,760,143 rows, where each row corresponds to one patent
citation, and 7 columns, which are the cited patent number, the citing patent number, the
firm owning the cited patent, the firm owning the citing patent, the grant year of the cited
patent, the grant year of the citing patent and an indicator to whether the cited patent is
an originating patent.
The source file is sorted by the citing patent number. Thus, the first row is the earliest
citation made in the sample, the second row is the second earliest citation etc. This sort
allows saving valuable running time due to the fact that a citing patent cannot be cited
before it cites. This sort is crucial for the running time of the algorithm.
A.3.2. Data Structure
In order to create an eﬃcient algorithm that will produce the desired output in a reasonable
time considering the amount of data, we use a combination of a Tree procedure and a Hash
table. The Tree algorithm is a dynamic procedure that creates a ‘tree’ of patents without
any restrictions on the number of both direct and indirect oﬀspring patents. Each node
in the ‘tree’ contains two types of information: information extracted from the source
file, such as citing patent number and citing firm, and information that the algorithm
generates, such as the location of the oﬀspring patent in the ‘tree’. Note that the ‘tree’
is not balanced (its branches are not of equal length), thus it does not benefit from the
advantages of balanced ‘trees’, whose maximum length is already known. From this reason
a Hash table is used, which allows us to eﬃciently store the information on the oﬀspring
patents in the diﬀusion ’tree’ and save valuable search time.
The Hash table contains information on all the patents in the source file, both citing
and cited defined as items. Each item contains the following fields: the depth in the ‘tree’
(the generation of citation), the place in the ‘tree’ (how it is linked to the originating
patent) and an indictor to whether the patent is an originating patent. The place of the
patent in the ‘tree’ is stored as a vector of numbers, as explained below.
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A.3.3. Running process
Each row in the source file indicates a ‘father-child’ relationship in the ‘tree’. The searching
and updating procedure involves scanning the source file for every originating patent and
updating the Hash table for each row according to the location of the citing patent in
the diﬀusion ‘tree’ (in case a patent does not take part in the diﬀusion ‘tree’ of a given
originating patent, its line is not updated).
The best way to explain the procedure of the algorithm is by a simple example. The
following list of citing and cited patents is a sample taken from the source file:
Citing Patent Cited Patent
3988245 3852388
3988250 3852388
4032309 3852388
4119408 4032309
4174374 4119408
4564373 4174374
4617029 4174374
4629563 3988245
4629570 3988255
4666607 3988245
4737166 4174374
Given this list, the algorithm will begin with the first row in the file, which says that
patent number 3988245 cites patent number 3852388. As the algorithm starts to construct
a new diﬀusion ‘tree’, it first checks whether the cited patent in the first row is part of the
set of the originating patents. If it is not part of this set, the algorithm skips this row and
jumps to the next one. If it does belong to the set of originating patents, the algorithm
starts the construction of the diﬀusion ‘tree’ for this patent by updating the Hash table
for this row and for the next rows in the source file. We will show now how the updating
procedure takes place.
The entries in the Hash table at the end on the running and updating procedure is as
following (at the beginning of the procedure, the items in the Hash table are initialized to
-1):
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Patent number Originating Place Depth
...
3852388 originating = 1 PlaceInTree = 1 Depth = 1
3988245 originating = 0 PlaceInTree = 11 Depth = 2
3988250 originating = 0 PlaceInTree = 12 Depth = 2
4032309 originating = 0 PlaceInTree = 13 Depth = 2
4119408 originating = 0 PlaceInTree = 131 Depth = 3
4174374 originating = 0 PlaceInTree = 1311 Depth = 4
4564373 originating = 0 PlaceInTree = 13111 Depth = 5
4617029 originating = 0 PlaceInTree = 13112 Depth = 5
4629563 originating = 0 PlaceInTree = −1 Depth = −1
3988255 originating = 0 PlaceInTree = −1 Depth = −1
4629570 originating = 0 PlaceInTree = −1 Depth = −1
4666607 originating = 0 PlaceInTree = −1 Depth = −1
4737166 originating = 0 PlaceInTree = 13113 Depth = 5
...
Once the algorithm finishes scanning the source file, another function is called in to
print all the branches of the ‘tree’ into a file. These branches are unique sequences of
patent citations, which we interpret as lines of research. The printed lines of research are
than given in a text format ready to be analyzed in any statistical package. Determining
whether a line of research is Internalized or Externalized is a straightforward task, as we
only need to compare the first firm in the sequence of citations to the last firm. If these
are identical (and there is at least one external invention along the line of research, such
that spillovers are created), the line of research is Internalized. Other wise, it is classified
as Externalized.
The next step is to clean the memory and initialize the Hash table before proceeding
to the next originating patent, and repeating the same algorithm.
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A.4. Theoretical model - developing equation (2.6)
This section shows how the expression of the dynamic returns in equation (2.6) is derived.
The model does not include time, only generation of developments of the originating
knowledge k. Suppose the model starts at the point in time where knowledge k becomes
available for sequential innovation by other firms (and by the inventing firm i). All com-
putations of the expected number of wins relate to the point of view of this starting
period.
The probability that firm i wins in generation g, as calculated at the initial period, is:
P (g) =
g−1X
s=0
µ
g − 1
s
¶
[p(1− q)]g−s qs (A.10)
It should be noted that the term qs reflects the ability of the firm to build on external
research along the line of research it originates. The probability that knowledge is created
in a given development stage and firm i not winning in this stage is q(1 − p) + pq = q
(since the firm does not win either if it fails to invent, or if it succeeds to invent, however,
at least one other firm succeeds as well).
I aim at computing the expected dynamic returns to knowledge k, given the expected
number of development stages won by firm i. For this purpose, the following equation for
the expected number of development stages won by firm i has to be computed:
E(wins) =
∞X
g=0
P (g) =
∞X
g=0
g−1X
s=0
µ
g − 1
s
¶
[p(1− q)]g−s qs (A.11)
Taking g to infinity (assuming the knowledge k has the potential of being developed an
infinite number of times) and computing the expected number of inventions firm i makes
along the line of research can be expressed as following:
p(1− q)
p2(1− q)2 p(1− q)q
p3(1− q)3 2p2(1− q)2q p(1− q)q2
p4(1− q)4 3p3(1− q)3q 3p2(1− q)2q2 p(1− q)q3
p5(1− q)5 4p4(1− q)4q 6p3(1− q)3q2 4p2(1− q)2q3 p(1− q)q4
Define h ≡ (1− q) p. The summation of equation (5.23) over g can be computed by
first summing each column across its rows and then summing over columns. Also, define
s as the number of times the firm failed to win a development stage and then summing
over s equals 0 to infinity.
Summation of s = 0 (zero failures):
S0 = h+ h2 + h3 + h4 + ... (A.12)
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S0 =
h
1− h (A.13)
Summation of s = 1 (one failure):
S1 = q
¡
h+ 2h2 + 3h3 + 4h4 + ...
¢
(A.14)
Which can be written, as following:
h h2 h3 h4 ...
h2 h3 h4 ...
h3 h4 ...
h4 ...
Using the same method, I can first sum across rows and then across columns. This
yields:
S1 =
q
1− h
£
h+ h2 + h3...
¤
=
q
1− hS
0 (A.15)
For s = 2 (two failures) I get the following summation:
S2 = q2
¡
h+ 3h2 + 6h3 + 10h4 + ...
¢
Which can be expressed in the following form:
h h2 h3 h4 ...
h2 h3 h4 ...
h2 h3 h4 ...
h3 h4 ...
h3 h4 ...
h3 h4 ...
h4 ...
h4 ...
h4 ...
h4 ...
Using the same method described above, this summation becomes:
S2 =
q
1− hq
¡
h+ 2h2 + 3h3 + 4h4...
¢
=
q
(1− h)S
1 (A.16)
With s = 3 (three failures) the summation is:
S3 = q3
¡
h+ 4h2 + 10h3 + ...
¢
(A.17)
Which can be expressed, as following:
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h h2 h3 ...
h2 h3 ...
h2 h3 ...
h2 h3 ...
h3 ...
h3 ...
h3 ...
h3 ...
h3 ...
h3 ...
As before, this summation becomes:
S3 =
q
1− hq
2
¡
h+ 3h2 + 6h3...
¢
=
q
(1− h)S
2 (A.18)
Thus, the summation of columns is a geometric series with a multiplicative factor
equals q
(1−h) and the first argument in the series is
h
1−h .
Thus, the dynamic returns as a function of the number of ‘second chances’ the firm
gets, θ, are given as (thus, θ is the number of columns to sum:
Wi(θ) =
(1− q) pv − x
(1− p) (1− q)
Ã
1−
µ
q
1− (1− q) p
¶θ+1!
(A.19)
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A.5. The technological contribution of an invention - an alternative interpre-
tation
This section shows that the methodology of measuring technological contribution is a
generalization of the accepted approach of measuring the quality of patents by counting
the number of citations they receive, while also including indirect oﬀspring patents.
To illustrate, refer back to figure 2. Under pattern 1 there are three oﬀspring inventions,
and, therefore, there are three citing (direct and indirect) patents, where each citing patent
is cited only once. It should be noted that it is assumed that the last patent in the sequence
is counted as if it receives one citation. Thus, TC1A = (1× 1) + (1× 1) + (1× 1) = 3.
With respect to diﬀusion pattern 2, there are three oﬀspring inventions as well. However,
patent B receives two direct citations and, therefore, it receives the weight of 2. This
implies that TC1A = (1× 2) + (1× 1) + (1× 1) = 4. These measures are identical to the
lines of research approach.
A closer look at this methodology would show that the scheme is recursive. Assume
patent C in figure 2 under diﬀusion pattern 1 receives another citation from patent E
(thus, it is cited twice, by patent D and patent E). Using the lines of research approach,
there are two lines of research: A→ B → C → D and A→ B → C → E. Thus, TC1A =
(1× 3) + (1× 3) = 6. Under the alternative approach discussed above, TC1A is computed
as following: starting with patent C (we continue to assume that the edge patents, D and
E in this case, are cited only once), it receives two citations of quality one each (the quality
of patents D and E). Regarding patent B, it is cited only once (by patent C). However,
since patent C is of quality 2, I treat the citation from patent C to patent B, as if patent
B receives two citations. In this case, TC1A = (1× 2) + (1× 2) + (1× 1) + (1× 1) = 6,
which is the same as the technological contribution under the lines of research approach.
More formally, the alternative interpretation of the methodology is the following:
TCi =
X
k∈Ki
OSik × bQk (A.20)
And bQk is expressed as:
bQk = X
j∈J
OSkj × bQj (A.21)
Where, Ki is the set of patents that cite directly or indirectly patent i, OSik denotes
the oﬀspring invention k ∈ Ki, j is another patent in the set Ki, which directly cites
invention k, Jk is the set of patents that directly cite invention k (i.e., j ∈ Jk ⊂ Ki),
OSkj denotes the oﬀspring invention which directly cite patent k and bQj is the quality of
invention j.
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A.6. Linearizing equation (5.5)
A linear version of equation (5.5) is estimated to test the robustness of the findings to
specifications where the term log(1+γKitAit ) is approximated by a polynomial series expan-
sion. The series of functions used for this approximation is denoted by γΦ(KitAit ), which
is linear in γ. I experiment with a series expansion of degree one (Φ(KitAit ) =
Kit
Ait
), two
(Φ(KitAit ) =
2X
j=1
³
Kit
Ait
´j
), three (Φ(KitAit ) =
3X
j=1
³
Kit
Ait
´j
) and four (Φ(KitAit ) =
4X
j=1
³
Kit
Ait
´j
). Thus,
equation (5.3) becomes:
log
µ
Vit
Ait
¶
= log κit + γΦ(
Kit
Ait
) (A.22)
Where, γ and log κit are specified in equations (5.2) and (5.4) , respectively. Equation
(5.5) is estimated by OLS, where the standard errors of the marginal eﬀects are computed
using the Delta method.
Table A3 reports the estimation results with a series expansion of degree one (thus,
log(1 + γKitAit ) ≈ γ
Kit
Ait
). Column 1 reports the estimation results of including R&D over
assets linearly and interacted with IntSpill and ExtSpill (as in column 1 in table 4
for the nonlinear specification). The pattern of results is similar to the one observed in
the nonlinear estimation. The coeﬃcient on the interaction term of IntSpill is positive
and significant and the coeﬃcient on the interaction term of ExtSpill is negative and
significant. Compared to the equivalent nonlinear specification (column 2 in table 4), the
linear specification yields a lower coeﬃcient on the interaction term of IntSpill (0.089
compared to 0.208) and a lower coeﬃcient on the R&D over assets (0.229 compared to
0.280). The coeﬃcient on the interaction term of ExtSpill is similar to the coeﬃcient
obtained from the nonlinear specification.
The elasticity of market value with respect to the R&D stock, evaluated at the mean, is
0.093, compared to 0.103 in the equivalent nonlinear specification. An additional one dollar
spent on R&D raises market value by 0.44 dollar, compared to 0.49 dollar in the nonlinear
specification. A one standard deviation increase in IntSpill raises private returns by 17
percent (compared to 30 percent in the nonlinear specification), whereas a one standard
deviation increase in ExtSpill lowers private returns by 5 percent (compared to 10 percent
in the nonlinear specification)54.
In column 2, the set of pre-sample means is added. The coeﬃcients on R&D stock over
assets and the interaction terms of IntSpill and ExtSpill substantially drop, however,
their signs do not change and they remain significant. In column 3, I add the linear terms
54The eﬀect of IntShare in the linear specification is identical to its eﬀect in the nonlinear specification.
A one standard deviation increase in IntShare raises private returns to an extra dollar spent on R&D by
39 percent.
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of IntSpill and ExtSpill. The coeﬃcients on the linear terms of IntSpill and ExtSpill
are similar to those obtained from the nonlinear specification, i.e., IntSpill is positive
and significant and ExtSpill is negative and significant. The coeﬃcient on the interaction
term of IntSpill drops, however it remains significantly positive, while the coeﬃcient on
the interaction term of ExtSpill do not change much.
In columns 4 to 6, similar robustness tests are repeated as reported in table 5. Thus,
adding linearly and interacted the citations-weighted patents stock and R&D Pool. The
same pattern of results regarding IntSpill and ExtSpill (linear and interacted) remains.
[Table A3 about here]
In table A4, I experiment with higher degrees of polynomial approximation55. Columns
2 to 4 report the estimation results with a polynomial expansion of degree two, three and
four, respectively. I find the same pattern of results regarding the interaction terms of
IntSpill and ExtSpill. With regard to the coeﬃcients size, as the degree of the polynomial
expansion rises, the eﬀects of the linear term of R&D stock over assets and its interactions
with IntSpill and ExtSpill rise. For example, the elasticity of Tobin’s Q with respect to
R&D stock over assets in the fourth-degree polynomial approximation is 0.14, compared
to 0.09 in the second-degree polynomial approximation. Nevertheless, although the size of
the eﬀect changes, the pattern of results is very robust to any form of linear approximation.
[Table A4 about here]
Finally, I test the robustness of the above findings to four-digit industry eﬀects. Table
A5 reports the estimation results of including a complete set of four-digit industry dummies
in polynomial expansions of degrees one and two. The same pattern of results holds,
where the coeﬃcient on IntSpill is positive and significant and the coeﬃcient on ExtSpill
is negative and significant. Interestingly, the eﬀects of the linear term of R&D stock
over assets and its interactions with IntSpill and ExtSpill rise when exploiting only the
variation within four-digit industry SIC codes.
[Table A5 about here]
55The marginal eﬀects are computed by diﬀerentiating equation (5.5) with respect to each variable.
Standard errors for the marginal eﬀects are computed using the Delta method.
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Number of lines of 
researcha
1979-19801976-19781969-1975Total sampleTotal sample
7.2%7.6%8.2%7.6%46.8Pooled
5.7%6.3%6.4%6.2%28.8Chemicals
7.1%7.1%8.8%7.6%30.2Computers and 
Communications
8.4%16.8%19.1%15.0%16.8Drugs and Medicals
7.5%7.1%7.5%7.4%78Electrical and 
Electronics
7.9%9.1%9.1%8.8%15.5Mechanicals
bComputed as the ratio between Internalized lines of research and the total number of lines of research.
Table 1
 Internalized and Externalized lines of research
Share of Internalized lines of researchb
aComputed as the average number of lines of research per citations received by an originating patent for the entire 
period of the sample.
Standard 
deviationMaxMinMedianMeanMnemonicVariable 
4589100.145.90IntSpill
25.2391.500.010.384.28ExtSpill1
0.040.2500.000.02IntShare2
2.34200.11.322V/ATobin's Q
16,782485,56605924,689VMarket value, $m
319547343049806KR&D stock, $m
11000.200.39K/AR&D stock / Assets
9,736199,3032.133923,090ACapital stock, $m
11,412180,55706863,925Sales, $m
4899,8480.42 18155Patents stock
58512,6430.2816158Patents stock weighted 
by citations
2For about 40 percent of firms IntSpill equals zero. 
Table 2
Descriptive statistics: accounting and patents variables
9,454 observations and 476 firms
The statistics are computed over all the observations that were included in the estimation (1980-2001) and are given in 
thousands of 1996 USD.
1Divided by 100.
Four-digits 
SIC
Three-digits 
SIC
Two-digits 
SICOne-digit SIC
0.240.230.301.51IntSpill
15%8%6%3%% Between industries variation
85%6%94%97%% Within industries variation
0.610.360.542.84*ExtSpill
31%12%9%5%% Between industries variation
69%88%91%95%% Within industries variation
1.52*1.47*1.71*1.37IntShare
52%36%25%3%% Between industries variation
48%64%75%97%% Within industries variation
Table 3
Analysis of Variance - diffusion variables
Table entries are the F -statistics for the null hypothesis of equal mean across the 
different industry breakdowns. * denotes that the mean varies across industries at the 
5 percent significance level.
(5)(4)(3)(2)(1)
0.217*0.167*0.152*0.145*0.280*R&D stock/Assets
(0.040)(0.029)(0.028)(0.021)(0.079)
0.062* 
(0.012)
0.059* 
(0.009)
0.059* 
(0.010)
0.096* 
(0.029)
0.208* 
(0.095)
IntSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)
-0.005* 
(0.002)
-0.004* 
(0.001)
-0.004* 
(0.001)
-0.005* 
(0.002)
-0.011* 
(0.003)
ExtSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)
0.028*0.027*0.031*log(IntSpill)
(0.005)(0.005)(0.005)
-0.026*-0.026*-0.023*log(ExtSpill)
(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)
0.028*0.031*log(Sales)
(0.003)(0.003)
-0.029*-0.024*log(Industry Sales)
(0.006)(0.006)
0.533*Sales Growth
(0.017)
YesbYesYesYesNoPre-sample meansa
9,0159,4549,4549,4549,454Observations
0.5160.5110.5090.5010.323R²
Table 4
The effect of IntSpill and ExtSpill on Tobin's Q
Nonlinear Least Squares, dependent variable: log(Tobin's-Q)
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and serial 
correlation (clustered at the firm level). * denotes a significant level of 5 percent.
All regressions include 78 two-digits industry dummies, 4 technology indicators, a 
complete set of year dummies, a dummy variable for R&D stock equals zero and a 
dummy variable for IntSpill equals zero.
aThe set of pre-sample means: Market Share, Employees, Tobin's Q, Sales, Assets, R&D 
stock, Patents stock and Citations stock.
bThe estimates for the pre-sample mean variables are as following: Employees 0.003 
(0.002), Market Share -0.106* (0.018), log(Tobin's Q) 0.544* (0.011), Sales 0.013 
(0.027), Assets -0.856 (0.592), Patents stock -0.009 (0.013), Citations stock 0.029* 
(0.007) and R&D stock -0.292 (0.335).
Linear 
effects
Firm fixed-
effects
Interaction 
terms
(3)(2)(1)
One standard deviation 
increase
+16%+30%+30%Internalized Flows
-6%-10%-10%Externalized Spillovers
+37%+50%+40%Internalized Share
Quantitative effects of IntSpill, ExtSpill and IntShare
Table 5
Note: columns (1), (2) and (3) are based on the corresponding columns in tables 
3 and A5. Thus, column 1 includes only R&D stock over assets and interactions 
with IntSpill, ExtSpill and IntShare, column 2 adds pre-sample means and 
column 3 adds the linear terms of IntSpill, ExtSpill and IntShare.
(10)(9)(8)(7)(6)(5)(4)(3)(2)(1)
DynamicStatic
0.083*0.182*0.197*0.276*log(IntSpill)
(0.038)(0.088)(0.031)(0.030)
-0.019*-0.032*-0.032*-0.048*log(ExtSpill)
(0.009)(0.011)(0.011)(0.014)
-0.736*-0.901* -2.083*-2.619*Dummy for IntSpill=0
(0.074)(0.079)(0.171)(0.170)
5.755*7.669*8.075*11.862*IntShare
(1.050)(1.423)(1.392)(2.000)
0.047*0.033*0.0220.006mean(Sales)
(0.012)(0.001)(0.013)(0.011)
0.035*0.041*0.034*0.053*mean(Industry Sales)
(0.006)(0.008)(0.006)(0.008)
0.054*0.011*0.0190.015mean(CW Patents stock)
(0.014)(0.003)(0.021)(0.018)
-0.0150.002*-0.008-0.041mean(R&D stock)
(0.009)(0.001)(0.054)(0.045)
0.568*log(R&Dt-1)
(0.006)
0.262*0.146*log(Salest)
(0.007)(0.013)
-0.199*0.044*log(Salest-1)
(0.007)(0.008)
0.125*0.296*log(Industry Salest)
(0.014)(0.019)
-0.007-0.033log(Industry Salest-1)
(0.008)(0.023)
0.079*0.286*log(CW Patents stock)
(0.008)(0.011)
0.3790.0770.4250.1130.4580.2230.5430.3910.9490.778R²
log(R&D)
dynamic
Fixed-effcets
The R&D equation includes a complete set of year dummies and a dummy for R&D equals zero.
Table 6
R&D expenditures and firm fixed-effects (FE1) estimation
9,454 observations (in the R&D regression), 476 firms (for the fixed-effects regressions)
Robust standard errors are in brackets. * denotes a significance level of 5 percent.
1The estimated firm fixed-effects are fitted from the R&D regression that is reported in column 1.
Static static dynamic
(4)(3)(2)(1)
0.187*0.183*0.222*0.204*R&D stock/Assets
(0.038)(0.037)(0.007)(0.039)
0.052* 
(0.014)
0.062* 
(0.012)
0.063* 
(0.012)
0.048* 
(0.013)
IntSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)
-0.005* 
(0.002)
-0.005* 
(0.002)
-0.005* 
(0.002)
-0.004* 
(0.001)
ExtSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)
0.021*0.024*0.028*0.025*log(IntSpill)
(0.005)(0.005)(0.005)(0.005)
-0.027*-0.026*-0.026*-0.027*log(ExtSpill)
(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)(0.004)
0.004* 
(0.002)
0.006* 
(0.002)
CW Patents Stock x 
(R&D stock/Assets)
0.016*0.010log(CW Patents Stock)
(0.006)(0.006)
-0.058 
(0.062)
-0.035 
(0.066)
Market Share x (R&D 
stock/Assets)
0.0730.061Market Share
(0.051)(0.049)
0.059 
(0.066)
0.074 
(0.064)
R&D Pool x (R&D 
stock/Assets)
-0.024*-0.018*log(R&D Pool)
(0.009)(0.009)
YesYesYesYesPre-sample meansa
9,0159,0159,0159,015Observations
0.5160.5160.5160.516R²
All regressions include 78 two-digits industry dummies, 4 technology 
indicators, a complete set of year dummies, a dummy variable for R&D stock 
equals zero, a dummy variable for IntSpill equals zero, sales and industry 
sales.
aThe set of pre-sample means: Market Share, Employees, Tobin's Q, Sales, 
Assets, R&D stock, Patents stock and Citations stock.
Table 7
Robustness tests for the Tobin's Q estimation
Nonlinear Least Squares, dependent variable: log(Tobin's-Q)
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and serial 
correlation (clustered by firms). * denotes a significant level of 5 percent.
0.117*0.1330.133*0.319*0.0220.442R&D stock/Assets
(0.057)(0.109)(0.062)(0.095)(0.146)(0.367)
0.340 
(0.229)
0.237 
(0.542)
0.047* 
(0.012)
0.089* 
(0.015)
0.047* 
(0.012)
0.057* 
(0.023)
IntSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)
-0.435 
(0.368)
0.055 
(0.922)
0.001 
(0.004)
-0.018* 
(0.005)
-0.008* 
(0.004)
-0.004 
(0.007)
ExtSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)
YesNoYesNoYesNoPre-sample means
357357501501240240Observations
0.5670.2070.4480.1890.5160.308R²
R&D 
Dynamics
R&D 
Static
R&D 
Dynamics
R&D 
Static
R&D 
Dynamics
R&D 
Static
-0.0090.0310.189*0.283*0.318*0.279*IntSpill
(0.266)(0.238)(0.095)(0.136)(0.089)(0.092)
-0.0490.221-0.008-0.012-0.054*-0.029ExtSpill
(1.253)(1.030)(0.033)(0.039)(0.019)(0.021)
0.055-2.126*-1.316*-1.748*-2.323*-2.098*Dummy for IntSpill=0
(1.177)(1.061)(0.436)(0.652)(0.646)(0.729)
191925251212Observations
0.4320.4220.4020.4840.7220.629R²
Table 8
Dependent variable: log(Tobin's Q)
Dependent variable: Firm fixed-effects from the first stage R&D equation
(A) Semiconductors1 
(B) Computers and 
Communications2 
(C) Drugs and 
Medicals3
The effect of IntSpill and ExtSpill - Heterogeneous industries
Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and serial correlation. * denotes a significance 
level of 5 percent.
The R&D estimation is based on column 2 in table 6 for the static specification and column 2 in table
A4 for the dynamic specification (including the lag of R&D on the right-hand-side of the first-stage 
estimation).
(A) Semiconductors1 
(B) Computer and 
Communications2 
(C) Drugs and 
Medicals3
Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity. * denotes a significance level of 5 percent.
IntShareExtSpillIntSpill
-0.0020.3384.162log(mean Sales)
(0.003)(0.209)(3.585)
0.0000.064-0.127log(mean R&D Stock)
(0.001)(0.066)(1.138)
0.001-0.613-5.079log(mean Employees)
(0.003)(0.233)(3.994)
0.0090.0345.274log(mean CW Patents Stock)
(0.001)(0.109)(1.873)
-0.0010.2591.075log(mean Citations Stock)
(0.002)(0.128)(2.188)
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and serial 
correlation. * denotes a significant level of 5 percent.
The diffusion variables and the main characteristics of the 
firm: OLS estimation
Table A1
The estimation sample includes the 476 firms that are in our final sample.
(5)(4)(3)(2)(1)
0.217*0.141*0.135*0.120*0.330*R&D stock/Assets
(0.040)(0.026)(0.026)(0.064)(0.101)
1.311* 
(0.586)
1.379* 
(0.498)
1.702* 
(0.533)
2.341* 
(0.507)
5.624* 
(2.295)
IntShare x (R&D 
stock/Assets)
0.025*0.020*0.016*log(IntShare)
(0.007)(0.006)(0.004)
0.033*0.035*log(Sales)
(0.004)(0.004)
-0.011*-0.005*log(Industry Sales)
(0.006)(0.006)
0.538*Sales Growth
(0.018)
YesYesYesYesNoPre-sample meansa
9,0159,4549,4549,4549,454Observations
0.5040.4990.4960.4960.294R²
Table A2
The effect of InteShare on Tobin's Q
Nonlinear Least Squares, dependent variable: log(Tobin's-Q)
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and serial correlation 
(clustered at the firm level). * denotes a significant level of 5 percent.
All regressions include 78 two-digits industry dummies, 4 technology indicators, a complete 
set of year dummies, a dummy variable for R&D stock equals zero and a dummy variable 
for IntSpill equals zero.
aThe set of pre-sample means: Market Share, Employees, Tobin's Q, Sales, Assets, R&D 
stock, Patents stock and Citations stock.
(6)(5)(4)(3)(2)(1)
0.174*0.187*0.185*0.141*0.137*0.229*R&D stock/Assets
(0.037)(0.038)(0.028)(0.025)(0.025)(0.022)
0.028* 
(0.014)
0.029* 
(0.015)
0.030* 
(0.015)
0.026* 
(0.012)
0.044* 
(0.015)
0.089* 
(0.022)
IntSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)
-0.004* 
(0.002)
-0.004* 
(0.002)
-0.004* 
(0.002)
-0.004* 
(0.002)
-0.004* 
(0.002)
-0.008* 
(0.002)
ExtSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)
0.020*0.031*0.022*0.032*log(IntSpill)
(0.009)(0.008)(0.008)(0.008)
-0.021*-0.019*-0.026*-0.018*log(ExtSpill)
(0.007)(0.007)(0.004)(0.007)
0.003 
(0.020)
0.003 
(0.020)
CW Patents Stock x 
(R&D stock/Assets)
0.016*0.033*log(CW Patents Stock)
(0.006)(0.009)
0.002 
(0.033)
0.002 
(0.032)
R&D Pool x (R&D 
stock/Assets)
-0.043*-0.018log(R&D Pool)
(0.015)(0.014)
0.548*0.557*0.556*Sales Growth
(0.048)(0.048)(0.047)
9,0159,0159,0159,4549,4549,454Observations
YesYesYesYesYesYesPre-sample meansa
aThe set of pre-sample means: Market Share, Employees, Tobin's Q, Sales, Assets, R&D stock, 
Patents stock and Citations stock.
Table A3
The effect of IntSpill and ExtSpill on Tobin's Q
Linear estimation, dependent variable: log(Tobin's-Q)
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and serial correlation (clustered 
by firms). * denotes a significant level of 5 percent.
All regressions include 78 two-digits industry dummies, 4 technology indicators, a complete set of 
year dummies, a dummy variable for R&D stock equals zero and a dummy variable for IntSpill 
equals zero.
(4)(3)(2)(1)
0.353* 
(0.056)
0.292* 
(0.048)
0.233* 
(0.041)
0.137* 
(0.025)R&D stock/Assetsa
0.484* 
(0.091)
0.344* 
(0.061)
0.243* 
(0.045)(R&D stock/Assets)
-0.184* 
(0.062)
-0.069* 
(0.026)
-0.013* 
(0.005)(R&D stock/Assets)2
0.029* 
(0.012)
0.005* 
(0.002)(R&D stock/Assets)3
-0.001* 
(0.001)(R&D stock/Assets)4
0.063* 
(0.015)
0.059* 
(0.013)
0.041* 
(0.013)
0.044* 
(0.015)
IntSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)a
0.266* 
(0.067)
0.188* 
(0.047)
0.087* 
(0.031)
IntSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)
-0.233* 
(0.070)
-0.119* 
(0.035)
-0.022* 
(0.016)
IntSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)2
0.056* 
(0.021)
0.016* 
(0.005)
IntSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)3
-0.003* 
(0.001)      
IntSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)4
-0.008* 
(0.002)
-0.007* 
(0.002)
-0.005* 
(0.001)
-0.004* 
(0.002)
ExtSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)a
-0.0299* 
(0.012)
-0.024* 
(0.006)
-0.012* 
(0.004)
ExtSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)
0.016* 
(0.009)
0.009* 
(0.003)
0.002* 
(0.001)
ExtSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)2
-0.002* 
(0.002)
-0.001* 
(0.0002)
ExtSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)3
0.0001* 
(0.0001)
ExtSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)4
YesYesYesYesPre-sample meansb
All regressions include 78 two-digits industry dummies, 4 technology indicators, 
a complete set of year dummies, a dummy variable for R&D stock equals zero 
and a dummy variable for IntSpill equals zero.
aThe set of pre-sample means: Market Share, Employees, Tobin's Q, Sales, 
Assets, R&D stock, Patents stock and Citations stock.
Table A4
The effect of IntSpill and ExtSpill on Tobin's Q
Dependent variable: Log(Tobin's-Q); 9,454 observations
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and serial 
correlation (Newey-West corrected). * denotes a significance level of 5 percent.
aEstimated marginal effects, evaluated at the mean. Standard errors are calculated 
using the Delta method.
(4)(3)(2)(1)
0.348* 
(0.068)
0.199* 
(0.042)
0.342* 
(0.068)
0.197* 
(0.042)R&D stock/Assetsa
0.373* 
(0.074)
0.366* 
(0.074)R&D stock/Assets
-0.031* 
(0.009)
-0.030* 
(0.009)(R&D stock/Assets)2
0.055* 
(0.014)
0.072* 
(0.019)
0.054* 
(0.015)
0.071* 
(0.021)
IntSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)a
0.111* 
(0.039)
0.109* 
(0.041)
IntSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)
-0.022 
(0.029)
-0.021 
(0.029)
IntSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)2
-0.005* 
(0.002)
-0.007* 
(0.002)
-0.005* 
(0.002)
-0.008* 
(0.002)
Externalized Spillovers x 
(R&D stock/Assets)a
-0.012* 
(0.005)
-0.014* 
(0.005)
ExtSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)
0.002* 
(0.0006)
0.002* 
(0.0006)
ExtSpill x (R&D 
stock/Assets)2
0.0050.005log(IntSpill)
(0.018)(0.019)
-0.011-0.009log(ExtSpill)
(0.014)(0.014)
0.573*0.549*0.551*0.551*Sales Growth
(0.054)(0.054)(0.055)(0.055)
YesYesYesYesPre-sample meansb
YesYesYesYesFour-digit Industry effects
0.5720.5690.5680.569R²
All regressions include a complete set of year dummies, and a dummy for R&D 
stock equals zero and a dummy for Internalized Flows equal zero.
bThe set of pre-sample means: Market Share, Employees, Tobin's Q, Sales, Assets, 
R&D stock, Patents stock and Citations stock.
Table A5
The effect of IntSpill and ExtSpill on private returns to 
innovation: adding four-digit industry dummies
Dependent variable: Log(Tobin's-Q); 9,015 observations, 475 firms
aEstimated marginal effects, evaluated at the mean. Standard errors are calculated 
using the Delta method. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary 
heteroskedacity and serial correlation (clustered at the firm level). * denotes a 
significance level of 5 percent.
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